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The FIRST YEAR

PART V (CONTINUED)



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TITLE <u>The First Year of the Occupation - Occupation Forces in Europe</u> Series 1945-1946	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: Unclassified	
OFFICE OF ORIGIN AUTHORITY 705 804 11 May 48	For copy of REVIEW SEE 8-3.1 CA 1 V 1 C 1
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OCCUPATION FORCES IN
EUROPE SERIES

1945-1946

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN EUROPEAN COMMAND

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander in Chief

APO 757
August 1947

SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series

TO : All concerned

1. The War Department has directed that the history of the military occupation of Germany and Austria in World War II be recorded and interpreted as the events transpire. The agency which is responsible for preparing this history is the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command.
2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, publication of which was begun in 1947, consists of a series of studies, monographs, and narratives of the history of the occupation. From time to time, the Occupation Forces in Europe Series will include a summary volume giving a narrative history of the occupation. All the studies or volumes published in the Series for the year 1945-46 or a subsequent year make up the official history of the occupation for that year.
3. Each publication in the Occupation Forces in Europe Series is based upon a thorough study of the correspondence, directives, and other documents relating to the subject. It serves also as a digest and summary of the pertinent passages of the reports of operations which are made periodically to the Office of the Chief Historian by all staff divisions and major units of the European Command. Each publication in the Series, before being issued, is reviewed by the staff divisions or subordinate command whose responsibilities indicate a primary interest in the subject matter.
4. All persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward to the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, APO 757, their comments and criticisms, in order to make available all facts from which a definitive history may be prepared in the War Department.

Lucius D. Clay
LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, USA
Commander-in-Chief

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The First Year of the Occupation



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Occupational Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46

1. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: Unclassified

AUTHORITY M. S. 804 11 May 48

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
EUROPEAN COMMAND
FRANKFURT - AM - MAIN, GERMANY
1947

Unclassified
21 Dec 48

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UNITED STATES ARMY

1946 - 1947

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PART FIVE
(Continued)
A Survey of
Occupation Problems

CHAPTER XIII

THE EDUCATION AND TROOP INFORMATION PROGRAMS

1. Mission and Scope of the Education Program.

The education program as planned for the posthostilities period had a double purpose: first, it was the redemption of a debt to the men and women of the armed forces, so many of whom had been interrupted in their studies; secondly, it was a major weapon in the campaign for maintaining a high morale among the men eligible for demobilization and awaiting redeployment from the European Theater. It was estimated that approximately 600,000 men would be eligible for demobilization after the defeat of Germany, but none of them was to be shipped to the United States, except as casualties to fill up shipping spaces, until all troops to be redeployed to the Pacific had departed. Planning for the program had begun early, and by V-E Day the blueprints were in existence for extensive activities, including unit schools, technical schools, university study centers, the U.S. Armed Forces Institute, and courses in civilian colleges, universities, and technical schools.

2. Organization and Personnel.

The organization responsible for the program was the Information and Education Division, which had been established as a special staff activity at Theater and Communications Zone levels in April 1945. In August of the same year, the program was made the responsibility of the commanding general of Theater Service Forces. On 1 February 1946, the Information and Education Division was transferred to Headquarters, USFET, in line with the close-out of Theater Service Forces. In April 1946 it was redesignated the Information and Education Service. In the field, Information and Education officers with enlisted assistants were authorized in the Table of Organization and Equipment of army, division, and corps headquarters to be designated "Assistant G-3, Information-Education Officer," while each regiment or equivalent unit was entitled to a staff officer of the grade of captain designated "Assistant S-3, Information-Education Officer," with enlisted assistants. The training of personnel for these positions and of instructor personnel was carried out by the 6819th Army Information-Education Staff School from V-E Day until December 1945, at an average weekly rate of 600. After December, the use of civilian instructors from the United States had increased so that there was no longer any need for a wide-spread training scheme, and when the Information and Education Staff School opened in January 1946 in Höchst, Germany, the curriculum was limited to a Discussion Leaders' course, designed to prepare men to operate the Troop Information Program.

3. Operation of the Education Program until V-J Day.

a. By V-E Day plans for Theater-level education were well advanced, and on 1 August 1945, only 85 days after hostilities in Europe had ceased, Shrivenham American University opened in England with a registration of 3,641 students. Three weeks later, the second Army university opened at Biarritz, France, with 3,901 students, while preparations for the centralized technical school at Warton, England, were sufficiently advanced to allow its opening in early September. The organizational feat that had led to the establishment of these three university-level institutions which formed the bulk of the Theater-level program, was an outstanding achievement of the education program. Another major feature was a system called Training within Civilian Agencies, under which soldiers were placed as students or apprentices in civilian universities, colleges, professions, and industries. The range of subjects offered by this scheme ran from surgery to dressmaking, from law to wholesale distribution. Cooperating institutions were located in France and the United Kingdom, and the first courses began in June 1945. Another Theater-level branch of the education program was a system of on-the-job training offered by Medical, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Signal Corps units. All these activities involved absences of from two weeks to two months on the part of the soldier students. As quotas were necessarily limited, a high

standard of prerequisite qualifications was called for.

b. The education program was not entirely on the Theater level, however; a wide network of command schools existed, and the self-teaching and correspondence courses of the U.S. Armed Forces Institute served the troops who were unable through their location or duties to participate in other branches of the program. Command schools were set up in various units as soon as hostilities ceased, with such instructors as were available within the units and such material as was obtainable. They varied from small schools offering one or two courses to fifty or less pupils to the large division-level schools like Rainbow University, with an enrollment of several hundred and offering college-level courses in a wide range of subjects.

c. The U.S. Armed Forces Institute services were provided by the European Theater of Operations Branch, which had been set up in England in 1944, and by its subbranches and mobile unit. In addition to courses and tests, the Branch provided the machinery for accreditation in institutions in the United States for all educational work accomplished in the European Theater.

4. The Effect of V-J Day on the Education Program.

On this widespread and ambitious program the early coming of V-J Day had a tremendous effect. The end of hostilities meant that the entire energies and purpose of the Theater were redirected toward the redeployment of those troops eligible for demobilization.

The position quickly changed from one where there were large numbers of troops in the Theater requiring purposeful occupation to one where there were insufficient troops to perform the Army's mission. All branches of the education program felt the impact of the change: members of the overhead detachments, military instructor staff, and students at the Theater-level schools were redeployed, and difficulty was experienced in replacing the overhead and instructor personnel; units offering on-the-job training were alerted for movement and the students had to be transferred to other units for completion of their training; command schools closed down because of the redeployment of instructor staff or lack of students. Radical changes were required to fit the program to the new situation, and the War Department and Theater policies were, accordingly, redirected to this end.

5. Educational Policy for the Occupation Period.

In September 1945 the War Department notified the Theater that severe cuts were to be imposed on the education program for the occupation period, involving elimination of all activities requiring the extended absence of personnel from their units. The drastic nature of these measures aroused considerable alarm among Theater education authorities, and Brig. Gen. Paul W. Thompson, Theater Chief of Information and Education, was sent to Washington to confer with War Department officials on the future program. He took with him a plan providing for the following: an augmented and improved

command school program; extensive use of U.S. Armed Forces Institute services, with emphasis on supervised correspondence course study, especially in unit schools lacking qualified personnel for the usual type of classroom instruction; details to civilian institutions (this to be counterbalanced by the closing of all Theater-level schools); maintenance of a restricted scheme of Training within Civilian Agencies for military personnel on a leave status and for discharged personnel desiring to study in civilian universities and professions under Public Law No. 346 (the G.I. Bill of Rights). The War Department agreed to all the principles outlined by General Thompson and authorized an annual expenditure of \$19,300,000. It was provided that there should be one centralized Army university and one centralized Army vocational school, with capacity for approximately three thousand students each and courses of two months' length, both to be located eventually in occupied territory.

b. Manpower difficulties continued, however, and the plan had to be revised. By January the decision had been made not to retain any Theater-level schools for the occupation forces. In February command schools were suspended until July, except for literacy training and skills of value in the occupation, although other subjects might be continued at the discretion of the commander concerned. These measures, together with the closing of Theater-level schools and the decrease in Training within Civilian Agencies, reduced the overhead

personnel of the program from 4,100 to 1,173, and student capacity to 700. General McNarney, Theater Commander, communicated with General Eisenhower at the War Department, explaining his intention to proceed along this line of ruthless elimination on the ground that "the education program was primarily to occupy troops otherwise idle and awaiting redeployment and, therefore, it is not now justified for the purpose for which it was originally intended." The War Department accepted the general policy proposed by the Theater Commander, who conceded that, providing the situation improved, the education program could again be expanded. These curtailments were based upon the certainty that, until 1 September 1946, the Army would be severely strained from the manpower standpoint, so that it would be essential to reduce the number of noneffective military personnel during that period.

6. Implementation of Policy.

a. The first Theater-level school to close was Shrivenham American University, which was discontinued on 5 December 1945. The last term of Warton American Technical School ended on 12 January 1946, while Biarritz American University closed on 9 March 1946. Training within Civilian Agencies, which had expanded in January 1946 to include Swiss institutions, ceased operation in Switzerland by 31 March, in France by 25 March, and in the United Kingdom by 30 April 1946. To counterbalance this, efforts were made to improve the command school program and to increase the use of U.S. Armed Forces Institute services.

b. The culmination of the improved command school program was the Consolidated School Plan drawn up by the Information and Education Division. This plan divided the occupation territory into areas based on troop strength. These were further subdivided into districts, each of which was to be serviced by either a consolidated or a district school. To meet particular needs, special schools could be set up on a temporary basis. Instructors were to be United States civilians, many of whom had previously taught at the Theater schools, German nationals, authorized to teach only in a limited subject field, and qualified military personnel. The plan also made provision for administrative and supervisory personnel in the form of area superintendents and district supervisors. Courses were to be standardized and brought into line with those offered by the U.S. Armed Forces Institute, so that a student transferring from one district to another would not need to interrupt his studies, which could be continued either at another school offering his subject in the new district or through the U.S. Armed Forces Institute. Statistics covering all branches of the education program are given on the following page.

7. Mission and Scope of Troop Information.

The Troop Information Program was designed to make the American soldier the best-informed soldier in the world. Its aim was to present facts convincingly--so convincingly that false premises, vicious rumors, and negative or adverse attitudes would fall before it. Further

TABLE I
STATISTICS OF PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION PROGRAM
THEATER-LEVEL SCHOOLS

<u>School</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
Shrivenham	7,805	6,782
Biarritz	10,447	9,473
Warton	6,100	5,544
TOTAL	24,352	21,799

TRAINING WITHIN CIVILIAN AGENCIES		
<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
Educational courses	7,779	
Professional courses	3,236	
TOTAL	11,015	

U.S. ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE		
<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
Including university extension	118,060	
Excluding university extension		6,521

COMMAND SCHOOLS AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING		
<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
For month of June 1946		
On-the-Job Training	1,823	
Command Schools	13,435	
TOTAL	15,258	

NUMBER OF INSTRUCTORS IN MONTH OF JUNE 1946		
<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
On-the-Job Training		154
Command Schools		653
TOTAL		807

objectives were to teach good citizenship, to give the soldier a knowledge of the Army and its history and customs, and to arouse in him a pride in his nation and his outfit. To accomplish its mission the Troop Information program was designed to present timely subjects to military personnel through periodic discussions, conferences, and lectures. In addition, the program offered a certain amount of news, or current events, to insure that the soldier was kept well informed on domestic and world developments. During hostilities, Troop Information, or Orientation as it was then designated, was the major weapon in the battle against the Fifth Column, and formed an important feature of military training. Even before hostilities ended, plans were formulated to continue this type of training after V-E Day.

9. Mediums of the Troop Information Program.

The principal mediums of the Troop Information program in the European Theater were motion pictures supplied by the War Department; the American Forces' Network; unit stories which were a series of unit histories produced by the Information and Education Division, fifty-seven in all, designed to inculcate in the soldier pride in his outfit; Army Talks, a Theater publication that appeared weekly until March 1946, when the distribution of commercial periodicals such as Time and Newsweek had improved to such an extent that there was no longer a need for a separate periodical; and the Information

Bulletin, redesignated the Information and Education Bulletin, in March 1946, which was the official organ of the Information and Education Division and furnished discussion outlines and supplementary material, including maps, on the current troop information topic. Unit newspapers, also were encouraged throughout the Theater, and the Information and Education Division produced from time to time special materials in the form of booklets and pamphlets on specific orientation subjects, which were distributed throughout the Theater. The Allied Liaison Section and the Lecture Bureau were two sections of the Information and Education Division devoted to implementing Troop Information policies. Through their services, speakers were obtained from the United States and from Allied and neutral countries to give talks and hold panel discussions as a part of the Troop Information program.

9. Program Subjects.

The timely planning for the posthostilities period was manifest in the inauguration on 12 May, four days after cessation of hostilities, of a special six-weeks' program covering the redeployment and readjustment plan, a review of the campaign in the European Theater, backgrounds to the Pacific war and to the occupation of Germany, appreciation of the accomplishments of other nations and services and the achievement of the home front, and an outline of peace objectives. A further four-months' program was ready to go into operation on 12 August, but the sudden collapse of Japan necessitated a revision

of this on a long-range basis. The subjects covered by the final program were: accomplishments during the war, problems facing the soldier, problems facing the nation and the world, and the continuing mission of the Army. In addition to this routine program, there were special programs designed for troops being demobilized, for reinforcements arriving in the Theater, for civilian employees, and for dependents. Also, from time to time, supplementary programs stressed special aspects, such as the treatment of redeployment problems given in February 1946 after the large-scale demonstrations throughout the Theater, and the commemoration of V-E Day, which was organized on the first anniversary of that day.

10. Operation.

These various programs were conducted in a weekly period which was conducted on duty time and was mandatory for all troops. The period comprised two one-hour sessions until March 1946, when it was reduced to one hour. The directive issued in March 1946 specified that the size of discussion groups was to be not more than a platoon, except that, where there was a lack of qualified personnel to conduct the period, the group might be larger. Sessions were to consist of discussions or lectures followed by question periods, and discussion leaders were trained in a one-week course at the Information and Education Staff School at Höchst, Germany. Staff supervision of the conduct of the program was the responsibility of the Information

and Education Officer of the unit, but the efficient use and development of the program was a command responsibility. To promote an increase in command support, a series of three-day conferences was held for field-grade officers at the Information and Education Staff School.

GERMAN YOUTH ACTIVITIES

11. Preliminary Work on the Program.

In the conviction that a positive program of German youth activities would be needed, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, before D-Day delegated to the Education and Religious Affairs Branch of its G-5 Division responsibility for supervising (1) such a program. During the period immediately after V-E Day, however, no youth organizations were permitted without the consent of the Supreme Commander.(2) U.S. Forces, European Theater, by letter of 7 July 1945, authorized religious organizations to conduct welfare and athletic activities for young people; and a few weeks later Theater Headquarters directed German officials to "prepare a program of useful work for children. . . . pending the reopening of schools."(3) Bombings and evacuations during the war had caused thousands of children to be orphaned, injured, or lost; such war-born tragedies

rendered imperative the administration of welfare and relief work in the summer of 1945 throughout the United States Zone. To meet the problem, Military Government authorities established Jugendämter, or youth offices, to provide institutional care for orphaned, needy, or delinquent youths, and supervised the organization of other such agencies by the Germans. It was soon evident that, because of the magnitude of the complex social problems engendered by the war, a policy of more direct participation by Military Government was necessary to cope with the situation.

12. Contributions of Individual Army Units.

When the ban on fraternization with German children was relaxed on 8 June 1945, many units of American soldiers on their own initiative provided athletic events and discussion groups to entertain and instruct youngsters. Such spontaneous efforts were particularly successful in the Bremen Enclave, where the Office of Military Government encouraged the movement by supplying facilities and equipment. In the fall of 1945 Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes encouraged his officers and men of the Seventh Army to support the program in the Western Military District, comprising Grosshessen and Württemberg-Baden. To make it possible for Germans to gain an understanding of the American way of life through contact with his troops, General Keyes promoted the establishment of German youth organizations by subordinate commanders.(4)

13. Operation of the Program on the Theater Level.

To guarantee a continuity of interest in the project, and a certain degree of uniformity in its activities, as well as to prevent the subversion of the groups by undesirable political elements, it was considered advisable to launch the program on a Theater-wide basis. Plans made by military government officials of Grosshessen were incorporated by Theater Headquarters in October in a directive which included a complete set of regulations on youth groups and a standard application form for admittance into the contemplated clubs.(5) By terms of the directive, youth committees composed of responsible German adults were to be established at the Kreis level under the supervision of Military Government. Commanders of the Eastern and Western Military Districts were directed to foster the growth of voluntary organizations for adolescent children for cultural, religious, and recreational purposes. Membership was to consist of German youth between ten and eighteen years of age, and the young people were to be permitted to form branches of such international organizations as the Boy Scouts, the Young Men's Christian Association, and their counterparts for girls. Appended to the directive was a list of forbidden practices, which included parades, marching, and any form of premilitary or paramilitary training!(6)

14. Difficulties Encountered in Executing the Program.

By the end of 1945, three problems were pressing: expansion

of the program to combat the high rate of juvenile delinquency; procurement of supplies and equipment; and adequate leadership. On 2 April 1946 the Theater Commander directed that a staff study be compiled on the problem posed by juvenile delinquents, who were found to be less numerous in areas where an active youth program was in effect.(7) Attempts were made to find a way to obtain supplies from captured enemy materials and surplus Army stocks for use in the project. Securing competent leadership proved difficult, as many otherwise qualified Germans had Nazi affiliations, while a number of Americans who had evinced interest in the program were due for redeployment. By the end of January 1946, however, committees of adult Germans were directing the project in every Kreis of Württemberg-Baden and in almost every Kreis of Grosshessen. Similar committees were later formed on the Land level. In spite of all efforts to interest mature persons in the movement, the number of sponsors, both German and American, failed to keep pace with the increase of membership in youth groups.

15. Amplification of the Program.

Prepared in collaboration with military government officials, a Theater letter of 15 April 1946 provided for more active participation in the movement by the major commands and led to the establishment of a Youth Activities Section in the G-3 Division of Theater Headquarters. The directive authorized the transfer of surplus Army

athletic equipment to German youth clubs, halted requisition of such supplies from the indigenous economy by occupation troops, provided for the full-time services of an officer in each command to work on the project, and requested the submission of monthly reports from the commands on the progress made with youth activities.(8) Reports prepared in accordance with the letter indicated that by August of 1946 2,901 groups had been organized. From a total of approximately 2,100,000 German adolescents between ten and eighteen years of age, the program had attracted an estimated 481,000.(9) Under the stimulus of greater encouragement from Military Government, the German populace took the initiative in establishing such groups as the Wandervogel, and Pfadfinder. Youth hostels, long popular in pre-Nazi Germany, were revived, and a number of summer camps were opened. The U.S. Army permitted the use of sports areas and buildings which were not needed during the summer months. In spite of all such endeavors, however, disturbing reports reached Theater Headquarters concerning the mounting rate of juvenile delinquency, an aftermath of war not offset by constructive activity. The Office of Intelligence of Military Government gave warning in July that a more imaginative and comprehensive policy toward the program was essential if German youths were to acquire an understanding and acceptance of democratic ideology.(10)

THE UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY

16. Early Experiments.

The concept of a police-type occupation of Germany arose from the consideration of plans for the most efficient employment of the relatively small force available. The speed of redeployment in the fall of 1945, and the certainty that the Occupational Troop Basis would have to be reduced quickly, pointed to the necessity for economy in the use of manpower. The idea that the lack of strength in the forces of occupation could be offset by careful selection, rigid training, and high mobility cannot be attributed to any single individual, or indeed to any single agency. Before any plans were worked out for the organization of the U.S. Constabulary, units of the U.S. Army assigned to occupation duties in Germany had experimented with the organization of parts of their forces into motorized patrols for guarding the borders and maintaining order in the large areas for which they were responsible. In September 1945 the G-2 Division of

Theater Headquarters put forward a plan, which was carried into effect toward the end of the year, for the organization of a special security force known as the District Constabulary. In October 1945 the War Department asked Theater Headquarters to consider the feasibility of organizing the major portion of the occupation forces into an efficient military police force on the model of state police or constabulary in the United States.

17. Later Planning.

Ideas crystallized rapidly. At the end of October 1945, General Eisenhower, then Theater Commander, announced to the proper authorities, that the population of the United States Zone of Germany would ultimately be controlled by a superpolice force, or constabulary. In early November the strength of the proposed constabulary was announced as 38,000. Planning was well advanced by the end of 1945, when Theater Headquarters notified the War Department that the constabulary would be organized as an elite force, composed of the highest caliber personnel obtainable under the voluntary reenlistment program, and that it would be equipped with an efficient communications network, the most modern weapons, and sufficient vehicles and liaison airplanes to make it highly mobile. During the paper stage, the organization was known by a series of names. "State Police" was discarded for "State Constabulary." Then it was thought that "State" would be confusing, although the main United States Zone of Germany had been divided,

for purposes of civil administration, into three states, or Lander. When the organization emerged from the planning stage, it was known as the "Zone Constabulary," but before it became operational it was christened "U.S. Constabulary." This term did not include the Constabulary units in Austria and Berlin.

18. Appointment of Commander.

On 10 January 1946 Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, distinguished wartime commander of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions and the XXII Corps, was appointed commanding general of the United States Constabulary. At the direction of Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, a small group was detailed to assist General Harmon in carrying forward the planning for the new force. The headquarters of this planning group was established at Bad Tölz. Theater Headquarters had already announced the principle that the Constabulary would be organized along geographical lines to coincide as nearly as possible with the major divisions of the German civil administration, in order to facilitate liaison with the German police and the U.S. Offices of Military Government. Thus, Theater Headquarters had decided that there would be one Constabulary Headquarters for the entire United States Zone, a brigade headquarters at each of the capitals of the three German Lander, and group, squadron, and troop headquarters established at points selected for ease in performing the mission. Theater Headquarters had also directed that the Tables of Organization of the

Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron should be used in planning the organization of the Constabulary.

19. Organization.

As had been planned, under a corps-type headquarters were three brigade headquarters at the Land capitals. Each brigade consisted of three regiments, with headquarters established at or near Regierungs-bezirk capitals. Each regiment included three squadrons, each of which was located so as to cover one or more of the basic political subdivisions, the Kreise. Each squadron comprised five troops. Thus, the U.S. Constabulary at the end of 1946 included three brigades, nine regiments, twenty-seven squadrons, and 135 troops, as well as headquarters and service units. Early estimates of needed strength had been revised and a total of 32,750 officers and men was authorized.

20. Equipment.

The primary unit of the Constabulary, the mechanized troop, was organized on the pattern of the mechanized cavalry troop used in the war. In view of its tasks of road and border patrolling and policing, the Constabulary needed a greater number of hand weapons and light vehicles such as jeeps and armored cars. Each troop was divided for patrolling purposes into sections or teams, each of which was equipped with three jeeps and one armored car, the latter serving as a command vehicle and as support in case of emergency. A mobile reserve of one company equipped with light tanks was established in

each Constabulary regiment. Horses were provided for patrolling in difficult terrain along the borders and motorcycles for the control of traffic on the superhighways (autobahnen). Static border control posts were established at the crossing points.

21. Uniform.

The uniform of the Constabulary trooper was designed both to make him easily recognizable and to distinguish him as a member of an elite force. It was highlighted by a bright golden yellow scarf, combat boots with smooth outer surface, and helmet liner bearing the Constabulary insignia and yellow and blue stripes. The lightning-bolt shoulder patch in yellow, blue, and red combined the colors of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

22. Personnel.

Redeployment made it very difficult to obtain troops of high caliber to form the nucleus of this new organization. Furthermore, practically all the forces in the zone were engaged in static duties, particularly the care of displaced persons. Certain of the units designated for the Constabulary could not be reorganized and trained until released from their static commitments. The mechanized cavalry units assigned to the Constabulary were already operating as mobile patrols in certain trouble spots and could not be spared for proper training before their integration into the Constabulary.

Practically none of the units was located exactly where it was wanted under the Constabulary plan, which called for the blanketing of the entire United States Zone. Some of them were moved four or five times within a period of a few months before they finally settled in the area which they were to patrol. Barracks, many of which were being used by displaced persons, had to be obtained for the Constabulary units; new equipment had to be drawn from depots as far away as France and the Low Countries, and, most difficult of all, the personnel had to be selected and trained.

23. Nucleus Units.

To create high morale in the Constabulary as quickly as possible, elements of the famous 1st and 4th Armored Divisions and certain cavalry groups were assigned to form the core of the new organization. The units converted into Constabulary squadrons and regiments included cavalry squadrons and armored infantry, field artillery, tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft battalions.

24. Headquarters.

The headquarters of VI Corps, which had engaged in three major amphibious operations--Salerno, Anzio, and Southern France--and in 524 days of combat in Italy, France, and Germany, and Austria, became the U.S. Constabulary Headquarters. The 1st Armored Division, which was activated at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in June 1940 and which had become a veteran, hard-fighting unit during the first four months

of operations after the invasion of North Africa, supplied many tank and infantry units.

25. Brigades.

The 4th Armored Division, which furnished the three headquarters for the Constabulary, landed in France on 28 July 1944, and for the next two months spearheaded the drive of General Patton's Third Army across France, arriving in September at the German line along the Mosel River. Other high lights in the outstanding combat record of the 4th Armored Division were its link-up with the beleaguered airborne forces in Bastogne, the dash to the Rhine River early in 1945, and the rapid crossing of Germany in the period before V-E Day. It was one of the few divisions in the U.S. Army cited by the President of the United States for "extraordinary tactical accomplishments."

26. New Tasks.

These veteran units, seriously depleted by redeployment, now approached a task quite different from that of waging war, but one demanding initiative and high standards in training and discipline. Some of the combat units assigned to the Constabulary were carried temporarily as mere paper organizations, redeployment having taken all their officers and men. Although some units had up to 75 percent of their allotted strength, total strength was only 25 percent of that authorized.

27. Beginning of Organization.

In February 1946 Constabulary Headquarters was established in Bamberg. During the period when tactical units, released from the Third and Seventh Armies, were being redesignated as Constabulary units, the main tasks were training and reorganization. Continuous training was prescribed for the trooper so that he might attain an acceptable standard of discipline and all-around efficiency in the use of weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment.

28. Constabulary School.

a. Early in the planning it was realized that a Constabulary School would be necessary, for the Constabulary trooper must not only be a good soldier but must also know police methods, how to make arrests, and how to deal with a foreign population. An esprit de corps must be developed among the members of the Constabulary to foster high standards of personal appearance, soldierly discipline, and personal integrity.

b. The Constabulary School was established at Sonthofen, Germany, in a winter sports area at the foot of the Allgau Alps. This citadel had been formerly used as a Nazi school to train youthful candidates for positions of leadership in the Party. The curriculum for Constabulary officers and noncommissioned officers included instruction in the geography, history, and politics of Germany; technical and specialist training covering the theory and

practice of criminal investigation, police records, self-defense, and the apprehension of wanted persons; and indoctrination in the mission and functions of the Constabulary and the responsibilities of the trooper. The standards of the Constabulary School were comparable to those of Army Service Schools in the United States. A graduate of Sonthofen was qualified not only to perform his duties but also to serve as an instructor in his unit.

c. No replacement center for the Constabulary was established since it was felt that, after the Constabulary settled down to operations and personnel problems had been eased by the assignment of long-term enlistees, the school could operate as a combination school and replacement center. After March 1946, the school capacity was approximately 650 students per month. It was hoped that this number would be sufficient to replace the normal monthly attrition in the Constabulary.

29. Trooper's Handbook.

The basic rules to be followed by Constabulary troopers in the execution of their duties were incorporated in a manual called the Trooper's Handbook. Col. J.H. Harwood, formerly State Police Commissioner of Rhode Island, collaborated in the preparation of this manual, which benefited from many practical ideas gained by him in his broad police experience. His expert advice was of great assistance in the development and early training of Constabulary troopers.

30. Training.

The date of 1 July 1946 was set as that on which the Constabulary would become operational. The training program as originally planned aimed at the progressive development of the Constabulary so that a common standard of efficiency would be attained throughout the organization. The program was divided into three phases. During the first phase, prior to 1 April, attention was concentrated on the training of cadre and on the establishment of regimental and squadron headquarters, so that the Constabulary would be prepared to receive the approximately 20,000 men expected to fill the ranks. The second phase, between 1 April and 1 June, was a period of intensive training in the duties of both individuals and units. The final phase was planned as on-the-job training during June. The last phase, however, was omitted because of delay in receiving reinforcements, the necessity of moving units to their stations as accommodations became available, and the difficulties in obtaining essential supplies and equipment. During June, the three brigade headquarters were formed, each of them taking over the direction of three regiments. The progressive development of the command organization upwards from the squadron level was necessitated by the lack of trained officers and enlisted men for staff and command position. By mid-June the organization was complete and control was highly centralized. The Constabulary became operational on 1 July 1946 as scheduled, despite the fact that its training program had not been completed.

TRAINING PROBLEMS AND TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

31. The Training Problem.

Prior to V-J Day the course of training history in the European Theater was dictated by redeployment, readjustment, reorganizations, and reevaluations of missions. The period was marked by an effort to keep training problems abreast of the constantly changing situation. Planning was first centered on training units for service in the Pacific, while training of occupation troops was considered secondary in importance. After the surrender of Japan, all activities were centered on rapid redeployment to the United States. The troops remaining in Europe were undergoing readjustments and shifts. After the peak of redeployment had passed there were successive reductions in the occupation force, each of which required changes in the training program. The units remaining found that occupation duties had to be placed first and that training could be conducted only in time left after the occupation mission had been accomplished. There were progressive reductions in the amount of

training given replacements in the Zone of Interior and a decline in the quality of this training. Because the situation defied prediction, there were times when the futility of publishing anything was recognized by Headquarters; training directives were known to be outdated by the time they were distributed. As a result, the whole training program was largely decentralized to units and was generally not uniform.

32. Redeployment Training.

a. Planning for redeployment training was started in January 1945, when the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, submitted to the Chief of Staff a plan which provided that units to be redeployed for combat in other Theater should be qualified to perform their primary mission prior to departure from the European Theater. Special training plans were to be prepared for units which had undergone excessive turn-over of personnel or major reorganizations. The United States element of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, at Supreme Allied Headquarters, was made responsible for planning, while development of the detailed redeployment plan was the responsibility of the Commanding General, Communications Zone. It was first planned to provide a training command, and the 6th Army Group was assigned to this duty, but it was later decided that each major command could be responsible for training the units assigned or attached to it. The situation moved too rapidly for even the decentralized scheme to be carried out.

b. An Officers Posthostilities School was opened in July 1945 but proved ineffective, since many senior staff officers, returning late to the Theater after graduating from the course, were assigned to work which had little connection with their training. Quotas were difficult to fill because many officers were attending other schools.

c. Many German and Austrian facilities formerly used by the German Army were available and were taken over by United States forces. The French authorities opposed use of additional United States training areas in France and it was the policy of the U.S. Army to return to the French as many as possible of those used.

d. The method of redeployment had a strongly adverse effect upon training. No redeployed troops were trained according to plan. Readiness dates were frequently advanced so there was not sufficient time, training was subordinated to the sailing schedule, and ships were filled regardless of the units concerned. The rapid tempo of the redeployment did not permit the training of high grade technicians, and units were cleared without them. First plans provided for a redeployment program of eighteen months; this was later cut to twelve months, still later to nine. Initial directives from the War Department indicated that replacements would be available in the Zone of Interior, but they were not.

e. A directive of 15 June 1945 outlined a training plan for units to be redeployed, those to be inactivated, and those

remaining in the Theater. Commanding generals of major commands were responsible to their immediate superiors for the training of all units under their jurisdiction. An eight-weeks training period was outlined, and this was later increased to twelve weeks. Major commands were permitted to establish specialist schools with means available to them, but the directive provided for closing officer candidate and officer retraining schools on graduation of students then in training. Training readiness reports, training status reports, and training progress reports were devised to keep Theater Headquarters informed as to the training status of organizations. These were discontinued as of September 1945.

33. Readjustment Period, 15 August 1945 to 1 January 1946.

a. After Japan's collapse, a period of readjustment ensued. Instead of rapid redeployment of low-point men to the Pacific, there was a rapid return of high-point men to the Zone of Interior. The period was marked by a kind of paralysis. Troops did little or no training, owing to pressure of occupation duties and a general apathy toward things military. No training inspections were conducted during this time.

b. The training directive in effect at the time of the surrender of Japan provided for forty-four hours per week of training, which was later reduced to thirty-three hours, and stressed maintenance of efficient combat and service teams, military security, and preparedness to quell civilian disturbances. Participation in education,

athletic and recreational programs was required of all men marked for relatively long service in the occupation.

c. The Training and Education Branch, G-3, made a study of the feasibility of setting up a Theater Mountain Training Center.

34. The Training of Replacements.

a. A survey of the effects of War Department policy of releasing men in critical military occupational classifications indicated that a shortage of clerks, typists, and stenographers could be expected. Major commands were directed to place in those positions personnel with low scores, where possible, and to make surveys to determine probable future shortages. The burden of training typists and stenographers eventually fell upon the Adjutant's Administrative School and upon units through on-the-job instruction.

b. On 11 January 1946 the War Department directed that replacement training be placed on a thirteen-week cycle. On 24 January 1946 the War Department requested Theater views regarding further reduction in the training cycle in the Zone of Interior and type of training given. The Theater concurred with the War Department proposal that training for newly inducted replacements should be reduced to eight weeks of forty hours each, but stated that training of specialists would take a longer time and could not be successfully carried out in the Theater. On 30 January 1946 the War Department announced that replacement training in the Zone of

Interior had been reduced to eight weeks, but that the War Department could provide certain trained specialists.

35. Period of Adjustment to Occupation Mission, 1 January to 30 June 1946.

a. Many organizational changes which were reflected in the training program occurred between 1 January and 30 June 1946. The Constabulary was in the process of formation and units in the Theater were settling down to the occupation missions.

b. Training in military government directives dealing with the maintenance of law and order and control of the German population by assistance to the military and civil police was initiated in February 1946. About the same time, training was begun in radio telephone procedure, including communications, in shooting with practice ammunition, and in recognition of the more common types of United States, British, and Soviet airplanes. A ski instructors school was set up in the winter at Garmisch-Partenkirchen. In the spring of 1946, tactical units were directed to devote a minimum of forty hours per week to their work and training programs. Nondivisional service units were to give each individual a minimum of three hours basic and two hours technical training per week in addition to the troop information program.

c. Notes on Leadership and Command, a pamphlet covering basic doctrines for officers, company housekeeping, administration,

supply, and military justice, designed to explain and supplement Army Regulations, field and technical manuals, and Theater directives, was distributed to officers on 1 June 1946.

d. The training of the Constabulary was one of the most successful parts of the entire training program. Training and Education Branch, G-3, prepared a program of training and a draft of the Troopers Handbook and delivered it to the VI Corps, from which was formed Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary. Expanding on the data received, the Constabulary set up a comprehensive training program, which was carried out after 1 April 1946. About 1 June 1946, G-3 Division sent out three inspection teams--one to each brigade--to survey the results of Constabulary training. Their reports were favorable; Constabulary training had been highly successful.

36. Tactical and Technical Schools.

a. On V-E Day ten Countersabotage Instructional Teams, mobile training units of the Military Intelligence Service, were engaged in educating troops in prevention, recognition, and neutralization of enemy sabotage devices.

b. A Military Intelligence School was established on 7 May 1945 at Breaux, France, stressing subjects important in the disarmament of Germany. The European Intelligence School providing an Occupational Counterintelligence Corps Course was opened on 21 January 1946. In February a Russian Liaison Agents' Course opened

at this school, and in April the first Advanced German Language Course was initiated.

c. An Army Athletic Staff School was established in Paris in June 1945. Other schools were a Night Vision Testing School at Bamberg, a familiarization school in recoilless weapons, a school for liaison aircraft mechanics, an artillery gun mechanics school, and an Ordnance general supply school.

c. An Infantry training center was organized at the 9th Reinforcement Depot of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command in Fontainebleau, France, on 26 February 1945. Three types of courses were given: one for officer candidates, one for officers commissioned on the battlefield, and one for retaining officers from other branches for service in the Infantry. The Ground Forces Reinforcement Command instituted a program within the various replacement depots to train specialists for whom there was a great demand.

d. The Ground Forces Training Center inaugurated on 25 May 1945 the Adjutant General Administrative School of one week's duration, giving classes in personnel records and assignments. An Adjutant General Clerical School, giving one month's instruction in typing, military correspondence, and allied subjects, was started in Frankfurt on 1 March.

e. Responsibility for training Ordnance replacements was left to the major commands, which relied for the most part on on-the-job training.

f. To prevent an imminent shortage in trained military police, an over-all training program was set up by the Theater Provost Marshal's Office in July 1945. The complete course in functional training lasted four weeks. Training was the minimum required to enable the student to perform the duties of a military policeman or a criminal investigator.

g. The Theater Chief Signal Officer established a special Signal Corps School for training specialists in skills in which shortages existed. It was under the administrative control of Third Army, but under the operational control of the Theater Chief Signal Officer. It consisted of three divisions: administrative, radio, and wire.

h. After V-E Day, the Medical Training program was altered to emphasize training needed in the Pacific war. An intensive on-the-job training program was initiated on 2 February 1946 to train medical technicians.

i. Quartermaster training in the Theater was a continuing process. A Training Division, Office of the Chief Quartermaster, operated and supervised a Quartermaster School and a Cooks and Bakers School in France. Teams traveled throughout the Theater and attempted to improve messing by inspections, demonstrations, advice, and assistance to personnel operating messes.

j. Major commanders were responsible for the conduct of chemical warfare training within their commands. No chemical warfare

school was planned for tactical or service troops because units were already hard pressed to carry on assigned missions owing to the shortage of officer and enlisted personnel.

k. Excellent facilities existed for mountain training.

Ski training courses, military ski training, winter mountaineering, and six-day cross country tours were initiated at several schools for the purpose of providing qualified unit ski instructors. More advanced skiers were trained to conduct ski patrols in inaccessible terrain during winter months.

l. In January 1946, a two weeks course for the parachute infantryman, which included five jumps, was given for the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The 82d Airborne Division conducted ground training and practice jumps and three special airborne reviews at Tempelhof Airdrome, Berlin. A parachutist and glider school was established, from which one class was graduated.

CHAPTER XIV

SERVICES

SUPPLY, PROCUREMENT, STORAGE, AND ISSUE

37. Extent of Operations.

At the end of hostilities in Europe there existed a far-flung supply system which had grown up during more than three years of American effort in Europe to supply United States troops deployed from the shores of the Atlantic to the banks of the Elbe. The base of this supply system, which was constantly being adjusted to changing conditions, was in the Zone of the Interior, from which supplies were sent to the European Theater in accordance with an elaborate system of requisitioning or automatic shipment. From the European ports they flowed to depots and thence ultimately reached the troops they were to serve.

38. Command Channels.

a. The supply organization, like the combat organizations, had its command channels. Since the war effort in Europe was an

allied effort, Supreme Headquarters (SHAEF), commanded by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, exercised general supervision over the whole supply system, and in certain classes of supply, notably solid fuels and petroleum products, made the over-all allocations to the various national forces and civilian economies. Supply channels were principally national, however, and the policy of the United States supply organization was, for the most part, controlled by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, also commanded by General Eisenhower.

b. Operationally, supply was the responsibility of the Communications Zone under Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee, with its principal headquarters in Paris. In this headquarters were located the offices of the Theater chiefs of services, who exercised technical control over supply within their services, and under it operated the various base, intermediate, and advance sections, which had responsibility for supply installations and operations within their areas.

39. Advance and Base Sections.

The immediate supply support of the armies came from the Communications Zone advance sections, Advance Section (ADSEC) and Continental Advance Section (CONAD), which extended their activities into Germany but had no area responsibility there. They maintained the advance points from which the armies drew their supplies. Behind them, Oise Intermediate Section stretched along the whole length of

the front, controlling the intermediate depots and the transportation lines to the ports. Seine Section was responsible for the Paris area and the depots located therein, while the ports and base depots were operated by the following base sections: Delta Base Section in the south, with activities centering around Marseille and Toulon; Normandy Base Section in the center, handling the port facilities at Cherbourg, Rouen, and Le Havre; and Channel Base Section in the north, operating to a large extent in territory in which the principal tactical forces were British, and maintaining United States installations at the Belgian ports of Antwerp and Ghent. Channel and Normandy Base Sections were consolidated in June to form Chanor Base Section. In addition, there was the United Kingdom Base Handling supply and administrative functions in the British Isles. Within over-all allocations to the armies, army groups made decisions on allocations to the various armies under their command and acted as coordinating headquarters with Communications Zone.

40. Level of Supplies.

Under this system, the Theater was authorized a certain level of supplies within the depots, which was maintained either by automatic flow or by requisition on the Zone of the Interior. These Continental levels were 50 days for Class I; 60 days for Classes II, III, and IV; 30 days for gasoline; 45 days for other petroleum products; and 75 days for Class V supplies. In the case of Class V supplies, 15 days supply was authorized in the hands of troops, which

allowances were included in the Theater level of 75 days. In addition to the Continental level for petroleum products, 30 days' reserve was maintained in the United Kingdom. The chiefs of supply services at Communications Zone Headquarters were responsible for maintaining these levels of supply within their services in the Theater. The exact amounts calculated as a day of supply were based on factors of troop consumption and replacement computed from experience in the preceding years of combat. A large portion of these supplies came by automatic shipments based on determined consumption factors and were supplemented by requisitions only in the case of special needs. Requisitions on the United States were reviewed at Communications Zone Headquarters by the General Purchasing Agent to determine which could be made available from local procurement. Stocks obtained locally were then classified and entered into the depot system and requisitioned by using agencies, in the same manner as other supplies. Local procurement was also used in an emergency by troop commanders in the field.

41. Movement of Supplies to Continental Europe.

The quantities of supplies in long tons unloaded at Continental ports during April 1945 were:

Antwerp	628,227
Le Havre	165,438
Cherbourg	181,043
Ghent	277,553
Rouen	240,708
Marseille Area	484,451
Other Ports	47,722
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,025,142</u>

The sources of supplies are indicated in the following figures for the month of April 1945:

The sources of supplies are indicated in the following figures for the month of April 1945:

<u>Long Tons</u>	<u>Source</u>
1,049,939	United States into northern ports
490,752	United Kingdom
<u>484,451</u>	United States and North Africa into Marseille Area
<u>2,025,142</u>	Total unloaded on Continent

42. The Depot System.

a. The lack of intermediate depots led to a congestion of supplies in the port areas and delayed the unloading of ships. When high ranking officials of the Army Service Forces in Washington, including Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, visited the Theater in early 1945, they were very critical of the existing depot system, and as a result an attempt was made to create a depot system in depth. The policies governing this system were announced in a Standing Operating Procedure published by Theater Headquarters in March 1945. There were to be four kinds of depots--issue, filler, base, and key. Issue depots were to be located in the advance sections and were to be responsible for storing supplies within the levels prescribed and issuing them when required to meet the needs of the armies. Filler depots were to be located further to the rear, normally in an intermediate section, and were expected to store the major portion of Theater stocks and replenish the stocks of the issue depots. Base depots were to be located adjacent to the ports and were to be responsible for receiving, classifying, and storing supplies received from the ports or from local manufacturers, for serving as warehouses

to clear the ports and store excess Theater stocks, and for replenishing supplies in the filler depots upon direction of the chief of service concerned. Key depots were to be responsible for the storage and issue of items where the Communications Zone stocks of the item were such as to require centralized storage or stockage.

b. As the cessation of hostilities approached, this system was gradually being put into effect. But on 6 April 1945 Advance Section turned over all its installations to Oise and Channel Bases and moved into Germany and established its headquarters at Fulda, although it assumed no area responsibility. From that time on there were virtually no Advance Section depots. Advance Section had planned to operate an army maintenance area in Germany, but this did not work out because transportation prevented the forwarding of more than minimum daily requirements to the armies. As of V-E Day, the advance sections had very few supply establishments within Germany and these had only small quantities of supplies in them. The net result was that, at the end of hostilities, the system of depots as outlined in the Standing Operating Procedure was incomplete, though better organized than at any previous time. Many filler depots were also serving as issue depots, and some base depots were serving all three functions, as for instance the Quartermaster Depot for Class II and IV supplies at Lille-Mons in France. From the issue depots or from depots which were designated for the purpose, the supplies passed to army supply points, which in turn passed them on

to the using units in the combat zone. The establishment of a depot system in occupied Germany was a post-V-E problem.

43. Flow of Supplies.

a. The supply policies stipulated that armies were normally to place requisitions or demands on designated key or issue depots through regulating stations. The replenishment of issue depot stocks was to be accomplished by submission of requisitions on filler depots, thus making the flow of supplies forward from filler, key, and issue depots a matter of actual requirements. Replenishment of filler and key depots was to be accomplished by shipping orders or shipping directives issued by chiefs of services and based on stock status reports; replenishment of Theater supplies in ports and base depots was to be accomplished by requisitions placed by Communications Zone Headquarters on the Zone of the Interior or by local procurement. Thus, the movement of supplies into the rear depots was to be controlled by the chiefs of services.

b. In the detailed matter of requisitioning of supplies, the regulating stations played a key role. Regulating stations serving each army were set up by the advance sections to provide for the systematic and orderly movement of supplies to railheads or truck-heads, and thus generally to control the flow of supplies from Communications Zone to the armies. The regulating officer at each station was to serve as a liaison officer between the advance sections and the armies.

44. Supply Situation at End of Hostilities.

On V-E Day the armies were operating on strained transportation lines and carrying rather low reserves, and the reserves behind them in Communications Zone depots were very distant, owing to the rapidity of the advance. The supply position of the Theater as a whole was very good, however, and it was only the impossibility of developing the system in the rear areas behind so rapid an advance which was rendering the situation at all difficult. It is probably fortunate that reserve supplies were far behind, since V-E Day was to change the whole picture of the basic needs of the armies, and to reverse the priorities so that much material had to be shipped back to the Communications Zone for redeployment. Moreover, the United States was occupying considerable German territory from which it would have to withdraw in favor of other powers, and it was undesirable that large reserve stocks should be built up in those areas. With V-E Day, the requirements of the armies for petroleum products, rations, clothing, and individual equipment continued as before, but the need for combat equipment of various sorts, Chemical Warfare Service supplies, and ammunition was greatly decreased.

45. Changes in Supply Policies Occasioned by Victory in Europe.

The approaching defeat of Germany led to the development of rather complete plans for redirection of the supply effort. War Department policy laid down the principle that first priority

the War Department on 14 May 1945 set up the following priorities on troop equipment:

- (1) Equipment for troop units under movement directives for shipment directly to active Theaters.
- (2) Equipment and supplies directed shipped to active Theaters by War Department shipping orders.
- (3) Equipment for occupation-force needs.
- (4) Equipment as directed by movement orders, for troop units to be returned to the United States for station.
- (5) Equipment necessary for training of units for redeployment pending movement out of inactive Theaters.
- (6) Equipment and supplies directed shipped to the United States by War Department shipping directives.
- (7) Equipment, as directed by movement orders, for units being returned to the United States for inactivation.
- (8) All other requirements.

47. Organization Plan.

Originally, the Theater organization plan contemplated the establishment of the chiefs of services at Theater Headquarters. Apparently this would have entailed too much of a shift in the method of doing business under which the well-knit Theater service organization had been operating since the beginning of the war, under General Lee. Consequently, the plan was revised on 12 June 1945. The chiefs

of services were placed under the Commanding General, Communications Zone, and advisers to the Theater Commander, to be a definite part of the Theater Headquarters at Frankfurt, were named for each service. The plan provided for the establishment by Third and Seventh Armies of military districts in Germany which would handle all supply matters within the United States area of Germany, including those for the Navy and the Air Force. Theater Headquarters was to be the sole channel of communication with the War Department on matters of supply, policy, but Communications Zone was authorized direct communication with Headquarters, with Army Service Forces, and with the New York Port of Embarkation.

48. Theater Reorganization.

a. Before the discontinuance of the Combined Command on 14 July, the new Theater Headquarters was established, on 1 July 1945, as U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET). By 11 July all United States forces in Germany were in the areas assigned to the United States for occupation. On 20 July 6th Army Group was disbanded, and on 1 August, 12th Army Group. The two military districts were established on 1 August 1945 as the major ground force commands in Germany. Land Bavaria constituted the Eastern Military District, which was under the control of Third Army. The Western Military District, under the control of Seventh Army, was made up of Grossheessen, the parts of Baden and Württemberg not occupied by the French, and the Bremen subdistrict.

On 21 May, U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District, was established. The Bremen Port and Enclave Commands were set up in June. U.S. Forces in Austria was established as a command for which Theater Headquarters had logistical responsibility, though no responsibility for military government and political problems.

b. With the establishment of all these commands, the transition to an occupation organization was relatively complete. Liquidation of the two advance sections was begun on 10 June, and by 10 July their functions had been taken over by the armies. Logistical support to Austria was made a responsibility of Third Army at first, while that to Bremen and Berlin was at first a Ninth Army responsibility, then transferred to Seventh Army with the realignment into zones of occupation. Later Bremen Port Command was to assume this responsibility.

49. Establishment of Theater Service Forces.

a. In July a new plan was drawn up providing for an organization known as Theater Service Forces, European Theater (TSFET), to replace Communications Zone. The chiefs of services, theoretically directly under the Theater Commander, were to maintain offices in Frankfurt and Paris. As Army operation of the depot installations in Germany had not proved entirely satisfactory, Theater Service Forces was assigned responsibility for the operation of all fixed installations in occupied Germany and in the liberated countries, and command of all service troops.

b. This plan was put into effect on 20 September. Theater Service Forces was made responsible for all supply operations in the Theater, except for the immediate supply of troops, which was the responsibility of the Military Districts and Berlin District, while Theater Headquarters was responsible for over-all policy and for allocation of resources to the various commands.

50. Further Reorganization of Major Service Commands.

a. On 21 November the Bremen Subdistrict was redesignated the Bremen Port Command and placed directly under the command of the Commanding General, Theater Service Forces, except for military government matters. As of 15 April 1946 the Bremen Port Command ceased to exist and the units therein were attached to the 17th Major Port or to the largest service units located in the Enclave. The area itself was redesignated the Bremen Subsector (of Continental Base Section) with the same geographical boundaries as the Enclave. As far as supply was concerned, the 17th Major Port was now given the additional missions of receiving all supplies for the occupation forces and forwarding them to the areas of occupation as required to maintain the authorized supply levels, and of developing the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. Bremen was to be used for receiving and forwarding military government and UNRRA supplies until Military Government could make arrangements to have German civilian agencies assume this responsibility. Beginning on 6 June, base depots in the Bremen area were

closed out gradually and stocks removed to depots in the United States Zone proper, leaving Bremen only as a port, staging, and transit area.

b. On 3 December the Advance Section, Theater Service Forces, was set up at Bad Nauheim, twenty miles north of Frankfurt. This headquarters became on 29 December Continental Base Section, Theater Service Forces (CBS, TSFET). On 2 February Theater Headquarters announced that Continental Base Section, which was to take over the majority of the functions of Theater Service Forces by 15 March, would have the mission of logistical support of the occupation forces in Germany and Austria, the command of base and filler depots and Bremen Port Command, and the responsibility for bulk storage and distribution of supplies. It would operate as a separate command under Theater Headquarters. The Theater Commander would enunciate Theater supply and administrative policies. Certain logistical functions, such as determination of stock disposition, would be retained at Theater Headquarters. All communications with Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and with the War Department would be by Theater Headquarters.

c. Western Base Section, formed as a combination of Seine Section and Oise Intermediate Section on 15 January 1946, with Headquarters in Paris, absorbed Delta Base Section on 25 January 1946. Chanor Base Section and London Area Office were reassigned to Western Base Section on 15 February and 1 March 1946, respectively.

d. The Theater chiefs of services were transferred to

Theater Headquarters from Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, upon the discontinuance of the latter on 1 March 1946.

e. Seventh Army was inactivated on 31 March 1946 and its troops, installations, and area were transferred to Third Army.

51. Plan for Military Communities.

On 19 November Theater Service Forces Headquarters published a letter regarding the logistical support of the United States occupation of Germany which outlined a plan for subdividing the United States area into small posts called communities. This plan called for 112 military communities (including 25 for the Air Force) in 79 cities in Germany and three military communities in Austria. For planning purposes, each community was assumed to have a strength of 3,000 troops. Each community would establish its own station complement, made up of Military District or Air Force troops, which would receive and distribute supplies and store whatever amount of reserve supplies had to be held in the community. In addition, station complements would perform all maintenance below fourth echelon and would furnish local hospitalization. When practicable, small garrisons or installations would be attached to the nearest community for supply, maintenance, and hospitalization. Theater Service Forces would distribute supplies to communities and to isolated units which could not be attached to a community, would perform fourth and fifth echelon maintenance for all occupation forces, and would provide fixed hospitalization in addition to that furnished by the station complements.

52. Supplies for the Redeployment Program.

a. Concurrent with the problem of supplying the forces in Germany and setting up a permanent supply structure for the occupation, was that of supplying redeploying forces and developing the Theater as a distant base for the support of the war against Japan. The supply of the redeploying forces held first priority. First, the necessary supplies for troops being redeployed had to be assured, then supplies had to be provided for forces remaining in Europe and last, reserves had to be built up for the forces of occupation. Supplies remaining after these needs were met were to be made available for shipment to the Pacific or return to the United States for use as a part of the strategic reserve. If a surplus still remained, it was to be declared to the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission for sale.

b. The program as a whole called for the maximum utilization and repair and economic disposal of supplies in the Theater, with a minimum of dependence on the Zone of the Interior for replacement. Such a program was difficult of fulfillment in view of the deterioration of most mobile equipment, the shifting about of troops, the general let-down which came with V-E Day, and the redeployment of service troops.

c. Of the supplies to be handled and shipped in bulk rather than as a part of troop supply, the most important single item was ammunition. Commitments to the Pacific were generally met. Up to

the end of September some 320,000 tons of ammunition had been shipped either to the Pacific or to the United States. Large quantities of special purpose vehicles, such as amphibious trucks and small cargo carriers designed for operation in snow, the entire equipment for an armored division, 40,000 tons of spare parts, considerable shipments of greases and lubricants, and some 500,000 drums of oil were shipped to the Pacific.

53. Repair of Equipment for Redeploying Units.

a. The main supply problem of the Theater in redeployment was that of providing redeploying units with equipment serviceable for combat and with reserves sufficient for sixty days. Sources were depot stocks and equipment then in the hands of troops. While there was apparently enough material in the Theater to meet all needs if occupation forces were cut to a minimum, maintenance was the major problem, since most of this equipment was in unserviceable condition. In general, the Theater found itself pushed to meet the needs of redeployment while continuing operations in Germany. Demands for efficient and economic operation and repair were not so easy of fulfillment with the let-down which troops inevitably felt after V-E Day. Use of transportation facilities for recreational demands as well as for the achievement of military objectives cut heavily into the supply of vehicles and other equipment available for redeployment. Battleground equipment unsuited for further use in active combat

swamped the repair facilities of every service. Critical shortages of spare parts also complicated the picture. Only the early advent of V-J Day prevented a crisis in the matter of the Theater's meeting the redeployment supply demands.

b. The greatest bottleneck in the whole redeployment supply program lay in the out-movement of vehicles. Most vehicles in the hands of troops on V-E Day were considerably the worse for wear and required a great deal of repair work. At the end of July it was estimated that the Theater would be 6,000 behind for that month. This was explained by the slowness of the armies in releasing vehicles and by the fact that reconditioning was not progressing as fast as needed. On 19 July only 250 of the vehicles requested from the armies had arrived at Marseille. Communications Zone requested U.S. Forces, European Theater, to push the armies for better performance. Deficiencies were apparently not due to the armies, however, but resulted largely from shortstopping of vehicles by Communications Zone sections, which were taking them for housekeeping and other local work instead of feeding them into the redeployment pipelines. Maintenance establishments were overloaded with equipment in unserviceable condition. The question of service troops to man these establishments became more and more critical as time went on, and prisoner-of-war and civilian labor was inadequate for the task.

54. Packaging and Construction Material for the Redeployment Program.

A second pressing problem of redeployment supply was that of packaging materials and, especially lumber for crating and for the construction of redeployment camps. For the most part these materials were not in the Theater wartime stocks, and therefore had to be obtained by local procurement and requisition on the Zone of the Interior. For the most part all construction needs for the forces in Germany were subordinated up to V-J Day to redeployment needs.

55. Progress in Redeployment of Supplies.

For the most part, commitments for direct redeployment up to mid-August were met, and the outlook for meeting schedules of out-movement of vehicles in the near future was good. In July most units being indirectly redeployed had gone without their full allotments of clothing and individual equipment.

56. V-J Day Adjustments.

Relief from the pressure for redeployment of supplies came with the unexpected surrender of Japan. Whereas fairly elaborate planning had taken place prior to V-E Day for a redirection of the Theater's effort, plans for the most part did not take into consideration the changes which would come after V-J Day, as it was expected

that the war in the Pacific would last for at least a year longer. Therefore adjustments had to be made on the basis of immediate decisions of the War Department rather than on prearranged plans. The first instructions on the post-V-J period were received in the Theater on 12 August. These directed that all bulk shipments were to be suspended, while supplies en route to ports would continue and supplies at ports would be loaded. Ships destined for the United States were to sail as scheduled, while ships destined for active Theaters were to be held in the port area pending further instructions. The small remaining requirements for the Pacific continued to have first priority over Theater requirements. In addition to directing adjustments in redeployment supply, the War Department forwarded on 12 August a general policy plan of supply for what was designated as Period 2, the period between the defeat of Japan and the time that the bulk of wartime forces was withdrawn to the United States. This plan prescribed that existing policies and procedures should be continued and that existing levels of supply in inactive Theaters should be maintained. It also provided for a maximum disposition of property declared surplus by the War Department.

57. Supply of Occupation Forces.

During the early months of the occupation, there was a large force in Germany engaged in clean-up or occupation duties, or in work connected with redeployment. This force, much larger than the first

Occupational Troop Basis for which supply plans had been drawn up, had second priority for supplies, first priority being allotted to the redeploying forces. For the troops in Germany, the existing lines of supply through the ports of the liberated countries continued well beyond V-J Day. The shift toward use of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven for receipt of supplies and handling of supplies through a depot system completely within Germany had just begun by the end of September. Bremen was so badly damaged that the complete opening of the port area was delayed until 11 September well beyond the contemplated opening date of V-E plus 60. Conditions at Bremerhaven were not so bad, and it ~~was opened~~ on 22 June 1945, but the previously announced goal of supplying all occupation troops through German ports after V-E plus 60 was not realized. Nevertheless, Bremerhaven received 22,203 tons of the 1,147,884 tons of supplies landed on the Continent in June, and 165,942 tons of the 845,940 landed in July, and 193,436 of a total of 728,884 landed in August.

58. Depot System.

Plans were progressing for the establishment of a permanent depot system under each Military District and for the liquidation of Communication Zone functions in Germany. It was agreed that the armies would designate the installation sites, but that Advance Section personnel and Communications Zone methods would be used in establishing the depots. It was also agreed that the Advance Sections would turn

over depot operations to the armies on 10 June, but continue their other activities until 1 July. Actually the depots were developed by coordination between the armies and the Advance Sections. In addition to setting up a depot structure in the Military Districts to store a 45-day supply and, ultimately, to serve as filler depots, it was planned to develop base depots in the Bremen Enclave for the storage of a 15-day supply. By 2 July, Bremen Port Command reported that this was completed.

59. The Experiment in the Operation of Supply Installations by Armies.

The transfer of supply activities in Germany from Communications Zone Headquarters to Theater Headquarters was one which involved a number of adjustments. Communications Zone had planned to remove Advance Section and Continental Advance Section service troops from the army areas back into Communications Zone to aid in the redeployment program, while the armies were expected to operate their supply establishments with organic service troops, supplemented by combat troops and prisoners of war where necessary. In the final distribution of units, the armies retained most of the Advance Section and Continental Advance Section troops, while many army service troops rendered surplus by formation of the Military Districts were transferred to Communications Zone. Experience showed that the armies were not altogether effective in the unfamiliar role of handling

fixed supply installations. The efficiency of the chiefs of services in coordinating the supply organization of the Theater as a whole, was weakened by their peculiar position in Communications Zone Headquarters, much as it had been weakened during hostilities by the existence of Supreme Headquarters, with which they were not in constant contact and which assumed some of their functions in making direct contacts with the combat forces. As a matter of fact, the whole experiment in army operation of the depots and the supply system in Germany did not turn out well. It was decided in late July that operation of depots and command of all service troops should be turned over to Theater Service Forces so as to restore centralized supply control.

60. Supply Levels and Channels.

a. Theater Headquarters directed in late September that each chief of service should establish the disposition level for items authorized to be stocked and should establish storage facilities in occupied territory to accept such supplies as would be required. Supplies necessary in Germany were then to be moved from the depots in the liberated countries. General disposal centers were to be set up in which other supplies were to be earmarked for local consumption, for shipment to the United States, or for disposition as surplus. Each service was to present a tentative phased program for movement of supplies into occupied Germany.

b. The new revised Standing Operating Procedure No. 7, covering depot and requisitioning procedures, which had been pending since July, was finally published on 24 September. This publication covered all supply activities. The depot system was now defined as containing base, key, and filler depots, issue of supply to be made by supply points under control of the armies. Base depots were to be in the Bremen Enclave, while the major portion of Theater stocks was to be stored in the filler depots in Eastern and Western Military Districts and in Berlin. Filler depots in the liberated countries were to continue as long as necessary to furnish supplies for troops awaiting redeployment and to dispose of surplus property by shipment to Germany, by out-shipment, or by sale.

c. Theater levels were prescribed as 60 days for Classes II, III, and V, and 50 days for Class I for both occupation and redeploying forces, though replacement factors for the latter were to be based on Zone of the Interior factors. Class IV supplies were to be based on approved projects. Base depots in the Bremen Enclave were to maintain a 15-day supply of Classes I, II, and III. Filler depots were to maintain a 35-day supply of Class I, a 45-day supply of Classes II and III, and a 60-day supply of ammunition. The supply channels as of 31 December are illustrated in the study in this series entitled: "Supply, Procurement, Storage, and Issue."

61. Loss of Trained Men.

The operation of service installations during the last quarter

of 1945 was hampered especially by the redeployment of trained personnel. Constant revision of point scores and continuing readjustment of personnel created major difficulties. The shortage of service troops was somewhat alleviated by use of indigenous labor, prisoners of war, and displaced persons. Manpower shortages were particularly marked with respect to the maintenance of aircraft and automotive equipment.

62. Air Lift.

The amount of freight received in the Theater by air from the United States averaged approximately 285 tons per month from May to August 1945, 194 tons in September and October, 92 tons in November, December, and January, and 15 tons in February 1946. The cargo consisted mainly of spare parts for use in reestablishing transportation and communication lines, and for bringing unit equipment up to full operating condition, but it included also serum, vaccines, antitoxin, and medical equipment for the Chief Surgeon.

63. Storage in Germany.

a. In planning a permanent supply system for the occupation forces, it seemed desirable that as many as possible of service installations such as depots, dumps, hospitals, and maintenance shops should be concentrated in a rather compact area. The Hanau-Darmstadt-Aschaffenburg triangle was selected as the principal area for the location of such installations, and by the end of June 1946 all services except

the Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps had their base depots in this area. Designation of the mission of each installations remained a responsibility of Theater chiefs of services until 15 March 1946, after which Continental Base Section assumed the responsibility, keeping Theater Headquarters advised of these missions.

b. In Germany, 1,738,400 tons of supplies were stored in supply services depots at the end of January 1946, 2,044,800 at the end of March, and 2,471,500 at the end of June, at which time storage space was ample. As of 15 May 1946, 1,599,900 long tons of Theater reserve were in the desired location in occupied territory and 197,800 long tons remained to be moved.

64. General Nature of Supplies.

Tonnage shipped before 1 July 1946 to the United States Zone in Germany from France and Belgium consisted mainly of rations, petroleum products, clothing, a few types of artillery ammunition, lumber and prefabricated housing, equipment for manufacturing and repairing clothing, salvage and repair equipment, especially for the repair of shoes, mobile laundry units, material-handling equipment for use in the depots, and vast stocks of aluminium, brass, copper, and other equipment for use in electrical and plumbing work and in the manufacture and repair of refrigerators and heating units. Approximately 95 percent of these supplies were shipped by rail and the remainder by truck.

65. Pilferage.

The amount of pilferage of supplies in the Theater per month was reduced from \$869,000 in April to \$414,000 in June. Reports initiated by the Theater Provost Marshal indicating deficiencies in loading rail cars had been forwarded to appropriate major commands for corrective action. Security measures were stressed in inspections of installations and improvements recommended where security was deficient. When pilferage reports indicated inadequate security measures within a command, the command was directed to investigate and take corrective action.

66. Supply Levels.

Levels for each class of supply established for the Theater by the War Department in June 1946 were:

Class	Days of Supply		
	Minimum	plus	Operating
I	30		30
II	30		30 plus that authorized in War Department Tables
III (Gasoline)	15		35
III (other)	120		60
IV (Quartermaster Sales and Exchange Service only)	30		30
V	none		60

These levels were adequate to meet the known Theater operating requirements. In addition, the War Department authorized the retention of Class II and IV supplies required through 30 June 1949.

67. Military Communities.

By the end of June 1946, fifty-three military communities were established, supply responsibilities being limited, for the most part, to commissaries, post exchanges, and recreational facilities. The first dependents arrived on 28 April. Considerable difficulty was experienced in procuring sufficient household furniture for family quarters. Electric and other refrigerators were especially scarce. The total requirements for lumber in communities for the period 1 April 1946 to 31 March 1947 were estimated at 252,611,500 board feet. This was being supplied by imports and by German production. Up to the end of June 1946, the term "military communities" was commonly considered to apply to a locality in which dependents were housed and supplied, rather than to a subdivision of a Military District, as conceived in the organization plan. It was not until much later that the provisions of the original plan became fully effective, and at that time the military communities were redesignated "military posts" and greatly reduced in number.

68. Austria.

While Austria had been technically in the Mediterranean Theater at the end of hostilities, it was occupied by Third Army troops and for a time normal supply lines from Third Army were established. Eventually command relationship was worked out so that U.S. Headquarters in Austria, under Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, was to be the

United States authority on all military government and political matters, reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, while on matters of supply and administration, it was subordinate to Theater Headquarters. Eastern Military District was assigned the responsibility of supplying United States troops in Austria. This responsibility was limited to movement of supplies to railheads in the vicinity of Salzburg and Linz and operation of the necessary installations at these railheads. Headquarters in Austria was responsible for the handling and distribution of supplies after they left the railheads.

69. Supply of Berlin District.

Original plans for the supply of Berlin contemplated support by Ninth Army. Berlin District Headquarters entered Berlin on 3 July 1945, however, and the main responsibility for supply soon passed to Seventh Army. On 17 August the Bremen Port Command took over the responsibility for providing Class I and III supplies, although overlapping shipments from Seventh Army continued for several days thereafter. After that date Berlin District requisitioned on the Bremen Port Command for Classes I and III, and on Western Military District for Classes II and IV. After 1 February Berlin District was supported as a military community and supplied primarily by the depots in the Bremen Enclave, the balance of the supplies coming from the depots in the United States Zone.

70. Procurement in Germany.

a. Plans prior to V-E Day called for the U.S. Army in Germany to be subsisted as far as possible on German resources. These plans had to be abandoned. It was at first thought that at least some potatoes and other fresh vegetables would be available, but after an investigation in May 1945 Seventh Army reported that there would not be a surplus of foodstuffs in the near future, but more likely a shortage. Not even the needs of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and other elements expected to subsist on indigenous resources could be met from these sources and it was necessary to supplement them with U.S. Army stores. Units in the field had procurement programs on a small scale, and often instituted production programs of their own to meet shortages, particularly to obtain spare parts.

b. In view of the fact that production facilities were being used primarily for German civilian demands, in late August the whole production control program was placed under the G-5 Division which was to consolidate Army requirements with those for the maintenance of a minimum German economy and those established to provide exports to the liberated countries. Procurement for the Army was to be rigidly restricted to items necessary and ordinarily used in the military service. No procurement from local sources could be undertaken if the items were available through normal supply channels from Theater stocks. Procurement for military use of any items needed for the minimum civilian supply requirements of the German population was

not to be undertaken if the procurement was in quantities likely to conflict with the maintenance of the minimum civilian economy.

71. Procurement in the Liberated Countries.

Local procurement in the liberated countries was of two principal types: emergency procurement by commanders in the field of critically needed supplies, and long-term production programs which were arranged by the chiefs of services through the General Purchasing Agent. Local procurement had reached a high point prior to D-Day in the United Kingdom. After France and Belgium were overrun, their industries were enlisted to aid production for the needs of the U.S. Army, and incidentally the French Army, since it was operating through United States supply channels. In addition to the products resulting from the program specifically set up, other civilian produce might be secured to fill military needs. This type of local procurement was also undertaken by the chiefs of services under the control of the General Purchasing Agent. After V-E Day, coal shortages seriously hampered France's ability to produce for Allied military needs.

72. Curtailment of Local Procurement.

Even prior to V-E Day, steps were taken to curtail local procurement. At the end of October 1945, Theater Service Forces reported that all procurement programs in Europe were canceled except for 1,700 aircraft engine cases, 550,000 mugs for the American Red Cross,

1,300 tons of dried onions, 68,000 assorted flags, 14,000 tons of ice, 70 public address systems, and a few smaller purchases. It was estimated that procurement in European countries for April, May, and June 1946 would approximate the following amounts:

France	\$600,000
Belgium	\$400,000
Czechoslovakia	\$500,000
United Kingdom	\$500,000
Switzerland	\$200,000

73. Rations.

The Quartermaster Corps' task of supplying rations was rendered more, rather than less, difficult of fulfillment by the end of hostilities in Europe. This was due partly to the sudden increase in the numbers of displaced persons, recovered Allied military personnel, and prisoners of war who had to be fed. It was due partly also to many categories of persons who were subsisted by the Army. Each of these required a different menu, eleven of which were in force from one time to another: French Moslem menu, Continental Allied civilian menu, Italian service unit menu, prisoner-of-war menus (one for workers, one for nonworkers), Continental menu for Allied forces operating with the United States, Soviet prisoner-of-war menu, civilian ration for German employees of the occupation forces, and the "A", "B", or operational ration for United States troops. Keeping of ration accounts, rendering of returns, breakdown from bulk shipments, and further distribution to the consumers were all made

immeasurably more complex because of the issue of so many different types of rations. In September, owing to the termination of supply support to different foreign groups, the Quartermaster was able to reduce the number of menus to three: the standard "A" ration for United States military personnel, the Continental Allied menu, and the enemy or ex-enemy menu.

74. Balanced Stocks of Rations.

There was always the problem of maintaining balanced stocks for the purpose of issuing "A" rations, and of getting these balanced stocks to the troops. Several crises developed in this regard. In the armies and Advance Section immediately after V-E Day stocks were rather short and the issuance of balanced "A" rations was difficult. Most food supplies procured from sources within Germany had to be used for the subsistence of the various non-American elements for which the Army had supply responsibility. Soon, however, it became possible to reduce the high percentage of operational rations--"C", "K", and "10-in-1"--issued and gradually the point was reached where virtually all troops were receiving "A" rations most of the time. After numerous complaints that some soldiers were not getting enough to eat, the 10 percent reduction in the military "A" ration previously directed for those in sedentary occupations was discontinued on 19 September. As a result of this and of an improvement in balancing of stocks, menus during September were much more satisfactory. Some fresh fruits and vegetables were procured locally and fresh eggs and butter were received from Denmark.

75. Wastage of Food.

In April 1946, the Theater Commander reported to Washington that he was continuing his efforts to reduce overdrawing of rations and waste of food. He stated that he proposed to reduce the amounts of flour and fats available to snack bars and pastry shops by approximately 25 percent, as well as to cut the purchasing allowance of type "B" and private messes. In addition, he proposed that the military field ration in the Theater be reduced from 4,200 to 3,900 calories. He stated that the Theater Surgeon was of the opinion that this reduction could be made without any detrimental effect on the health of the Command.

76. Limitations upon the Local Procurement of Food.

At the Theater Commander's weekly staff conference on 23 April, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, stated that since September 1945 local procurement of Class I items had been limited by War Department policy of supplying all available items from the Zone of Interior, by military government policy of approving local procurement only in case that the required food was surplus to German needs, and by reluctance of the War Department to purchase supplies in Europe with dollars. Notwithstanding these limitations, substantial purchases of food in Europe had been programmed. Purchases from Denmark included: 1,000 tons of butter for delivery prior to 30 June 1946, 2,000 tons for delivery between 1 July and 30 November 1946, 1,000 tons for

delivery from 1 December 1946 to 28 February 1947; 1,500 tons of cheese for delivery prior to 31 December 1946. Orders had been placed for 2,000 tons of onions from North Africa for delivery in April and May 1946. Approximately 300 tons per month of fresh fruits and vegetables were being procured by Western Base Section for local consumption. Purchases from Germany included: 5,800 tons of vegetables and fruits for delivery during the first half of 1946, and enough potatoes to supply all forces in occupied territory from 1 July through 31 October 1946. Negotiations were in progress with Italy to provide fresh fruits and vegetables for United States forces in Austria. The procurement of fresh milk had been delayed by the reluctance of the Danes to enter into a contract because deliveries of large quantities of milk would necessitate reorganization of their butter and cheese industries. Beginning about 25 June, 500,000 litre bottles of German manufacture were to be procured monthly making possible the procurement of 200,000 liters of milk weekly by 25 July, and the full Theater requirement of 750,000 litres weekly by 1 October.

77. Coal.

a. Next to food, the most important item in the whole postwar European economy was coal. Coal was the key to industry, to rail transportation, to the heating of homes, offices, and factories. The U.S. Army required considerable amounts of coal for its own use and in many cases had to arrange for its issue to the civilian population.

The Army was also interested in the rehabilitation of the liberated countries, particularly those from which it was procuring supplies. Coal could be supplied only in small quantities from the United States, owing to its bulkiness and to domestic requirements.

b. The allocation of coal from sources in the liberated countries was made by the G-4 Division of Supreme Headquarters, working through the Missions to the various governments. Allocations were made to military and civilian authorities on the basis of coal available from import from the United States and Great Britain and that available on the Continent. At the end of hostilities, Communications Zone Headquarters was receiving an allotment of coal from the French Government. Coal was needed by the Army principally to carry out the manufacturing program and to operate the railroads though it was also required for heating. It was directed that use for heating be kept to a minimum so that needs might be more nearly met in the liberated countries where the supply of coal was insufficient to keep the industries going.

c. The German coal mines were found to be badly damaged. Most of the labor supply had been absorbed by the Wehrmacht, and returning miners did not have sufficient incentive to go back to work. Shortage of food for the miners and lack of mining equipment also rendered a resumption of production on a large scale difficult.

d. The only German mines under United States control were in the South. They were for the most part inferior mines producing

a relatively poor brown coal, suited for use by small industries and for heating purposes, but most of it not suitable for being made into briquets and shipped. So the needs of the U.S. Army as well as the requirements for maintaining the minimum civilian economy in the United States Zone had to be met by allocation from the other zones. In order to promote the production of coal in the United States Zone, inferior though it was, miners were given food rations of 3,600 calories when working above ground, and 4,000 calories when working underground. Transport of coal and of mining equipment was given a priority next to redeployment and essential troop maintenance, and the use of brown coal was directed in all installations where it could be used.

78. Wood.

On 13 August Theater Headquarters, noting that "the shortage of coal in the United States Zone of Occupation in the coming winter will be critical," directed that a wood-cutting program be expedited to provide 100 percent of the requirements for heating and shelter. Figures for the United States Zone show that about 40,000 cords were collected in August and about 50,000 more in September. This, however, was not a sufficient stockpile for the winter, as total requirements for Seventh Army were estimated as 248,000 cords and Third Army 265,500 cords. By the end of the following June the situation was satisfactory, with a stockpile in the Theater of approximately 80,000 cords.

79. Transportation of Coal and Wood.

Use of army vehicles was authorized in the collection of coal and wood, but the armies, with all their other commitments, were unable to provide many vehicles. While the coal problem in its long-range aspects was one of production, until the end of September the lack of transportation was the most important immediate cause of shortage in supply. Movements by barge were scheduled by the Rhine Interim Working Committee, whose headquarters was at Duisburg. Barge movements to the United States Zone consisted chiefly of coal, which was handled at the rate of approximately 230,000 tons per month.

80. Shortage of Vehicles.

The needs of the Theater for general-purpose vehicles were hardly diminished by V-E Day. Need for $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks (jeeps), $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks, weapon carriers, sedans, vehicles suitable for civilian transport, remained pressing. Such vehicles were used to transport displaced persons, prisoners of war, supplies, persons engaged in police and Military Government work, and in production control activities. They were used in the lumber and wood-cutting program, as emergency transport for coal, for recreational and Information and Education activities, and for other miscellaneous purposes. For the most part, vehicles were war weary and in need of repairs. War Department policy provided that no general-purpose

vehicles, except those already approved for shipment, would be shipped to the Theater for one year after June 1945. The Theater would have to meet the needs of direct and indirect redeployment with combat serviceable vehicles. Captured vehicles were one resource for administrative uses, but Supreme Headquarters ordered in late May that all these be used for maintaining German units waiting to be disbanded or for military government purposes. A great number of vehicles were unfit for use, both in the armies and in the Communications Zone, owing to shortages of properly qualified maintenance personnel and of spare parts. The Theater Commander continuously stressed the maintenance of vehicles, emphasizing the necessity for the improvement of first and second echelon maintenance. The Ordnance Department started several schools to train mechanics in all echelons of maintenance. By the end of March 1946 it was reported that the total number of vehicles in Ordnance Third echelon shops had been reduced materially.

81. Petroleum Products.

The consumption of petroleum products in the European Theater decreased only slightly during the months immediately following the close of hostilities. Petroleum products were at no time in short supply, but difficulties were often experienced in delivering them to units. After liquidation of the international organization which had operated under Supreme Headquarters and through the

British War Office in allocating petroleum products to the Allied and liberated countries, petroleum products were brought directly from the United States and distributed through Quartermaster channels within Germany.

82. Pipelines.

Supply of gasoline to the Army in Germany was accomplished mainly by three pipelines, one from Cherbourg to Mainz (the Major System), the second from Antwerp to Wesel (the Northern System), and the third from Marseille to Sandhofen (the Southern System). Supplementing these systems were storage tanks with a total capacity of approximately 700,000 barrels. Plans immediately after V-E Day called for a rapid liquidation of the Cherbourg and southern lines and the continued use of the line from Antwerp until storage facilities in the Bremen Enclave could be set up and tank cars procured for hauling petroleum products to the armies.

83. Temporary Shortages of Gasoline.

a. Although gasoline target levels of 60 days' supply had not been reached by the end of October, stocks were never seriously short. Delivery to the armies, however, did not proceed smoothly. Supplies were rather low in the armies at the end of the campaign but by the end of May they had been built up again by priority shipments.

b. The situation continued to be satisfactory through June, but a crisis of major proportions developed in Third Army on 16 July when the stock level had shrunk to 656,378 gallons of MT-80 from the 5,515,425 gallons on hand at the end of June, and the Army reserve was completely exhausted. Third Army was forced to institute a rationing program which cut consumption 50 percent, and the Chief of Transportation's Office went to work in cooperation with the Army to straighten out the transportation snarl. A program was arranged whereby the Theater Chief Quartermaster supplied a bulk reserve of gasoline to the Army for the period 26 July to 25 August.

c. At approximately the same time, a lesser crisis in the gasoline supply developed in the Seventh Army due to the slowness of tank-car turnaround. Shipment of gasoline to the Giessen Depot was embargoed for seven days while the tangle in rail transportation at that point was straightened out. On 22 July Seventh Army cabled that shipments of gasoline were only 5- percent of the amount requisitioned and requested that gasoline not shipped during the embargo be shipped to make up the deficiency. The Chief Quartermaster's Office answered that shipment had been delayed by a temporary shortage of tank cars at the Wesel pipe-head, caused by failure to unload promptly in the Giessen area.

d. During the final quarter of 1945 the Theater experienced a critical gasoline shortage. The authorized 60-day level of motor gasoline, 96,000,000 gallons, was reduced by 29 December to 29,000,000

gallons, the decline in stock being caused by failure of tankers to arrive as scheduled. Quick action was taken to alleviate the condition and prevent complete collapse of operations due to lack of gasoline. Gasoline was rationed to the major commands at the rate of one gallon per man per day. This lasted until 9 March, when gasoline allowances were increased for each command by block allocations based upon consumption reports during the preceding three months.

84. Clothing.

Immediately after V-E Day the armies instituted a drive to get all their units properly equipped with authorized clothing through replacement of battlefield losses and salvage of all worn-out stocks. A considerable shortage of clothing developed particularly in Third Army. Existing depot stocks were inadequate to replace combat-worn items and to outfit the units being redeployed. In an attempt to bring procedures back to normal, it was ordered that no issues of Quartermaster supplies be made except on salvage receipt, report of survey, or statement of charges. One of the most important items issued in the period under consideration was the new European Theater, or Eisenhower, jacket issued in June and July 1945. Efforts were made to provide the proper sizes in order to promote smartness in dress.

85. Housing.

Redeployment requirements for tentage and other materials

for constructing necessary winter quarters made supply to the armies difficult. Until V-J Day, most lumber available in Germany was taken for construction, packaging, and crating in the liberated countries. For September, however, winterization of accommodations for troops was given priority over redeployment, and the Engineers reported that winterization would probably be complete by 15 October. For the most part, existing housing was used for the troops rather than new construction or tentage. Engineer supply was generally satisfactory except for construction materials.

86. Situation at End of First Year of Occupation.

By 1 July 1946 supply problems were no longer so serious and the whole picture was approaching that of the Zone of the Interior in peacetime. The most important problems remaining were: avoidance of periodic shortages in gasoline and some items of food, keeping gasoline and food from falling into unauthorized hands; procurement of sufficient fuel and construction material; and procurement or training of qualified maintenance personnel.

TRANSPORTATION

87. The Transport Situation on V-E Day.

- a. When hostilities ended, thousands of railway cars

and trucks of ammunition, food, and fuel were moving to forward areas. Everywhere there was congestion; railroad yards were crowded with cars, and traffic was bottlenecked at the Rhinebridges.

b. The railways were transporting 80 percent of U.S. Army needs in spite of serious shortages of equipment. Most of the lines had been repaired to the Rhine. Bridges over the Rhine were open at Wesel, Mainz, Ludwigshafen, Karlsruhe, and Duisburg. A line in the Rhone Valley connected Marseille with the armies in southern Germany, and another major line connected Cherbourg and Antwerp with the railheads across the Rhine.(1)

c. Motor trucks were moving 18,000 tons daily on lines of communication averaging 110 miles in length. About 13,000 motor cargo trucks assigned to the service forces were clearing the docks and distributing supplies from the forward railheads. In spite of damage to bridges and highways, motor trucks could operate any place in Europe; but the truck companies were grouped at the two ends of the supply lines, the ports and the railheads. A portion of the cargo trucks assigned to the service forces were being used to augment transportation within the armies, which had 244 company-equivalencies as organic transportation.(2)

d. The inland canals and waterways of Germany were paralyzed by war damage. Efforts were being made to restore transportation on the Rhine and Danube Rivers. The canal systems of

France, Belgium, and the Netherlands had been restored to operation and returned to the control of their own authorities.

88. Missions.

After V-E Day there was a reduction in the supply requirements of the armies, but this was more than offset by the demands of redeployment and civil affairs. Displaced persons repatriated from the United States Zone by rail prior to August 1946 numbered 2,889,740; 267,763 refugees had come into the Zone while 326,535 had been removed. In addition 1,183,605 expellees and 247,819 German nationals from Austria had been transported. The number of passenger and freight trains on a typical traffic day had reached 5,000 in December 1945 and increased to over 6,000 by April 1946.

89. The Chief of Transportation.

a. The Office of the Chief of Transportation was a special staff division of the headquarters of both the European Theater of Operations and the Communications Zone and had divisions dealing with supply, marine operations, movements, inland waterways, control and planning, motor transport service, and military railway service. The Chief of Transportation and his subordinates worked in close cooperation with the Acting Chief of Staff, G-4, of European Theater of Operations and Communications Zone, as well as with the G-4 Divisions in the armies and lower echelons. The Chief of Transportation was responsible for the formation of new agencies within lower

echelons when these were necessary to carry out the transportation mission.

b. Communications lines passed through all echelons of command. Ships were unloaded at the ports and supplies were hauled through the base sections to the intermediate section and from there to the advance section for distribution to the armies. The Theater Chief of Transportation was the coordinating agent for this movement. During the period of combined command his channel of communication with the armies was through Supreme Headquarters.

90. Transportation Officers in the Communications Zone.

Transportation officers in each of the base sections of the Communications Zone supervised transportation within their areas. Their authority, however, did not extend to long-haul traffic. They frequently had direct contact with the office of the Chief of Transportation in Paris, bypassing the section headquarters. The base sections exercised considerable autonomy in distributing responsibilities among the staff sections.

91. Phases.

From a military standpoint there were three phases in transportation. In Phase I operations were exclusively military. In Phase II military agencies controlled operations, but civilian organizations participated as they became operational and were able to resume their normal functions. In Phase III transportation

facilities were operated by fully responsible civilian agencies. Motor transportation was largely a Phase I operation. Rail transportation in the liberated countries at first was largely in Phase II, and in Germany there was a gradual restoration of operations to the Germans. There was an early shift to Phase III railway operations in France following the end of hostilities. Phase III generally prevailed in the operation of the inland waterways of the liberated countries, with a greater degree of military operation in the occupied countries.

92. The Military Railway Service.

The General Headquarters, Military Railway Service, was an exempted command, responsible to the Chief of Transportation, except for certain administrative authority retained by Base Sections of the Communications Zone.(3) It supervised the 1st Military Railway Service, operating south and west of Paris and the 2d Military Railway Service, operating north and east of Paris. Railway grand divisions, usually coinciding with base sections, operated the railways and were allocated troops on the basis of track mileage. Operation of hospital trains was a Transportation Corps responsibility, but the trains were under the command of the Theater Chief Surgeon.

93. Military Railroads in Occupied Territory

In the United States Zone of Germany there were two main railway lines, one from Hanau through Würzburg to Nürnberg and the

other from Karlsruhe through Ulm to München and beyond. The line from Bremen by way of Hanover and Göttingen to Eichenberg, near Kassel in the United States Zone, was opened in June 1945 and its capacity had reached 24,000 tons daily a month later. United States military railway service to Vienna started 7 August 1945 with two trains operating between Linz and Vienna. A third Train, providing fast passenger and mail service, made its first run from Salzburg on 15 September 1945. Other lines in the United States Zone of Germany carried traffic into Austria by way of Passau in the north and Salzburg in the south.

94. Personnel.

When the campaign ended there were 161,268 members of the U.S. Army working under the Transportation Corps. By January 1946 much of this personnel had been replaced by locally procured labor.

95. Rolling-Stock.

After V-E Day the Transportation Corps generally required car-for-car interchange in movements out of the United States Zone of Germany, and this policy was reaffirmed by the Theater Commander on 26 September 1945. September inventories indicated that there were 8,000 locomotives in the Zone, of which only 2,500 were serviceable, and that of 166,000 cars slightly more than 118,000 were serviceable. There was an acute shortage of rolling stock and repairs were delayed by shortages of material and the damaged condition of six of the main repair centers.

96. Restoration of Tracks.

By 31 July 1945 78.6 percent of the first-line track in the United States Zone had been restored. By January 1946 this had increased to 96 percent, where it remained during the first half of that year. Repair of war damage to tracks in the United States Zone of Austria was 93.9 percent complete by 30 June 1946.

97. Development of the Ports of Bremen-Bremerhaven.

United States forces started using the port of Bremerhaven in June 1945, when 22,000 tons of cargo were discharged. By July 162,000 tons, or approximately 20 percent of the military cargo unloaded at Continental ports, came through this port. The peak was reached in April 1946 with 181,000 tons. Thereafter the decrease in Theater strength was reflected in reduced shipping. The total declined in June 1946 to 58,000 tons. By the end of June 1946, all personnel and cargo to and from occupied territory was being handled through Bremen-Bremerhaven.

98. Berlin District.

The 11th Traffic Regulating Group sent a transportation section to Berlin in July 1945. Transportation officers were established at rail stations, depots, and airports.(4) The District Transportation Officer was a member of the staff of the Berlin District Commander, but was not responsible for the operation of rail or barge terminals, which were under the Theater Chief. The first

United States supply train entered Berlin 27 July 1945. On 28 July a detachment of the 2d Military Railway Service arrived to assist in the supervision of Allied and German agencies. As Soviet officials refused to permit United States dispatch offices to operate along the line in the Soviet Zone, there was no way for Berlin transportation officers to know the location of freight trains. Passenger trains, which started running into Berlin on 15 October 1945, kept in touch with Berlin officials by radio. The Provost Marshal assumed responsibility for guarding supplies en route to Berlin during the first quarter of 1946.

99. Priority Committee.

On 7 June 1945 major commands formed a committee to allocate shipment priorities, a task which previously had been performed by the G-4 Division of the Communications Zone.(5) This committee, after it authorized movements, consolidated shipping requirements and compared them with Transportation Office estimates of capabilities. The executive committee was discontinued on 1 November 1945, and bids for movements were thereafter submitted to the G-4 Division of Theater Service Forces, which adjusted estimates and transmitted the information to the Chief of Transportation, who made the detailed adjustment of the program. This procedure was followed until 1 January 1946, when the monthly movements program was transferred to the Office of Military Government.

100. European Central Inland Transport Organization.

The European Central Inland Transport Organization was established on 8 May 1945 to allocate transportation resources in western Europe.(6) In November 1945 it called attention to rail car shortages in the Netherlands and Belgium, and Theater Headquarters curtailed rail loadings in those countries. The agency arranged for the transfer of cars from France to the United States Zone in April 1946, when there was a serious shortage in United States-occupied areas of Germany and Austria. It received bids for movement across the United States Zones of Germany and Austria and transmitted these bids to United States agencies, which included them in the monthly movement programs.

101. The Motor Transport Service.

The Motor Transport Service had operational control of motor transport units within the line of communications as well as technical supervision within the Communications Zone. Base Section commanders had direct supervision of motor transport units, although the Chief of Transportation could recommend, but not order, the assignment and reassignment of units. Highway Transport Divisions, which supported the armies, received movement instructions from the Advance Section Highway Movement Division. Each Division operated between 3,500 and 4,000 trucks, was a direct command channel for all battalions and companies assigned to it, and maintained liaison

with the G-4 Division of the army it served. Truck companies and battalions usually were formed into pools at railheads and dumps and Divisional Headquarters maintained a truck pool.

102. Motor Freight.

The XYZ freight hauling program was using nearly two-thirds of the eighty-six trucking companies assigned to line of communications hauls in Advanced Section and Continental Advanced Section during May. As this activity approached an end, a large number of trucks was loaned to the armies. Large-scale freight movements from the ports in northern France and Belgium were carried out from May until September 1945 in a new ABC movement, similar to the ABC truck-movement program which had operated from January to March 1945. United States units in Berlin were supplied by truck until July, but the use of trucks gradually diminished thereafter. Long-distance motor freight hauls, frequently made when units were transferred, were organized as needed. During February and March rail operations from Bremerhaven were hampered by floods, and gasoline was moved by truck from Farge in the Bremen area to Giessen in the United States Zone. Roads were bad and the total of 2,700 tons moved was far short of the original targets.

103. Inland Waterways Division.

After V-E Day branches of Inland Waterways Transport Service in Paris, Brussels, and Rotterdam chartered barges and coordinated

military movements. The Rhine River Branch of the Division at Wiesbaden had been activated on 15 April 1945. It conducted reconnaissance up to V-E Day, after which it supervised ship repair and aided Engineer units to clear the river. The Danube Branch, opened at Linz, Austria, on 27 May 1945, took charge of captured craft in the Third Army area and maintained a river patrol. The Transportation Section of Third Army was responsible for the restoration of the Danube waterway. Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a joint Danube commission under which international traffic could be re-established.

104. Rhine Navigation Agency.

The Rhine Navigation Agency, made up of United States, British, and French elements, was established on 7 May 1945 to coordinate efforts to open the Rhine to navigation.(7) This agency, which included Engineering and Navigation Sections, formulated basic policies regarding the Rhine during the period of combined command. Army groups, in their respective areas, implemented the Agency's decisions. On 29 August 1945 the Inland Waterways Committee of the Directorate of Transport, Allied Control Authority, absorbed the functions of the Rhine Navigation Agency and an Interim Working Committee held meetings twice monthly at Duisberg, but subsequent efforts to organize a permanent Allied control organization for policy-making purposes were fruitless, owing to lack of international agreement.

105. Rhine Clearance.

The U.S. Army opened the Rhine from Koblenz to Karlsruhe and the channels of the Main and Neckar Rivers. This work was completed by 15 August, but the British portion of the Rhine was not cleared until 1 September and the French portion not until October. About 85 percent of the German floating equipment on the Rhine had been sunk, but by 20 May 1945 a considerable portion of this had been restored. It was augmented by conversion of Army equipment and use of craft formerly of French, Netherland, or Belgian ownership, which had been returned to those countries.

106. Military Districts.

Transportation officers, who represented the Theater Chief of Transportation, served on the staffs of the commanding generals of the two Military Districts. Each Military District maintained four subdistrict transportation offices, which were responsible to the District Officer. The Rhineland, prior to the transfer of that territory to the French, was a fifth subdistrict of the Western Military District, and Austria at one time was a fifth zone under the Eastern Military District. In March 1946 the number of subdistricts was reduced to four, with headquarters in Munich, Nürnberg, Mannheim, and Bad Nauheim. All of these came under Third Army, which also opened offices in Koblenz and Hanover to control traffic through the British Zone. Continental Base Section took over the Third Army Transportation Section in June 1946.

107. Military Government.

Military Government assumed many of the transportation functions in the occupied areas early in 1946. The Theater Motor Transport Service, the Theater Military Railway Service, and the Theater Inland Waterway Transport Service were discontinued as technical services on 1 January 1946. Germans gradually assumed more of the responsibility for the operation of transportation agencies under military government policies.

COMMUNICATIONS

108. Coordination of Signal Communications.

Supreme Headquarters in March issued instructions covering communications responsibilities for the period following the German surrender.(8) Instructions prepared by the Signal Division of Supreme Headquarters allocated responsibilities for communications for the press, disarmament units, prisoners of war, and displaced persons.(9) Prior to the termination of combined command, the Combined Signal Board coordinated signal communications for all forces under the Supreme Commander. Following the termination of combined command, the United States, British, and French military authorities established a Provisional Multipartite Signal Board, which replaced the Combined Signal Board. The Soviet Union was invited to join but did not send

representatives. The Provisional Tripartite Board allocated radio frequencies and coordinated interzonal wire circuits, while another agency, the U.S. Joint Signal Board, coordinated signal matters affecting United States headquarters and services within the Theater.

109. The Military Network before V-E Day.

The Allied Expeditionary Force Long Lines Control, with offices at Paris and Brussels, represented the Supreme Commander in controlling main trunk telecommunications facilities on the Continent. Underground cable rehabilitation in the liberated areas had made possible the limitation of open wire lines to a few vital circuits. Cross-Channel submarine cables provided more than a hundred circuits. High frequency (HF) radio provided stand-by facilities to back up long distance wire circuits, while very high frequency (VHF) was used in mobile tactical situations. Major headquarters in the Theater were connected by teletype with the world-wide Army Command and Administrative Network. The Signal Messenger Service delivered messages by air, ship, train, and motor.

110. Development of Signal Communications.

In mid-April work was started at Frankfurt on signal communications for Supreme Headquarters. A 1,200-line Siemens automatic telephone system was available in that city. Three exchanges, with a total of 7,000 lines, formed the backbone of the military exchange

system in Berlin. An advance party of Signal Corps technicians entered Vienna late in July to install communications prior to the arrival of the headquarters. Installations in Germany and Austria were connected by wire, radio, and messenger service and similarly with the War Department and with main headquarters in the United Kingdom, western Europe, and Italy. Within occupied Germany, where lines of communication had radiated from Berlin, United States needs required the development of lateral circuits from Frankfurt to Bremen and Munich. Each military headquarters was responsible for providing communications down to the next lower echelon. Headquarters, 12th Army Group, maintained radio link communications, as well as wire and cable communications, to army and other major headquarters during the early months of the occupation.

III. The Theater Signal Communications Service.

On 17 July 1945 the Theater Signal Communications Service was established to carry out Theater-wide construction, maintenance, and operation. Long lines liaison and administrative responsibilities formerly under Supreme Headquarters control at Paris were brought within the new agency. Specific responsibilities assigned to Theater Signal Communications Service included: construction, maintenance, and operation of Theater long lines open-wire systems; rehabilitation, maintenance, and operation of cables in the Theater main line network; installation, maintenance, and operation of all high frequency, very

high frequency, super high frequency, and ultra high frequency radio systems between major headquarters in the Theater and between the European Theater and other Theaters or the Zone of the Interior; installation, maintenance, and operation of all communication services at Theater Headquarters; preparation of procedures for control of main line telephone and telegraph traffic; establishment and operation of trunk messenger service for the Theater; coordination with military government officials in the reestablishment of the long lines system of the former German Reichspost; and command of all Signal troops assigned to these functions.(10)

112. Development in Communications Plant.

In the final quarter of 1945 a Theater-wide network of telegraph carrier systems was developed and United States terminal equipment formerly used on these systems was 95 percent replaced by German equipment. During the first quarter of 1946 extensive changes in the long lines circuits were made necessary by the move of Stars and Stripes from Paris to Germany, by the establishment of Continental Base Section at Bad Nauheim, by the disbandment of Chanor Base Section, by inactivation of Seventh U.S. Army, and the transfer of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, to Heidelberg. Gradual transfer of long lines responsibilities to the German Reichspost began on a "demonstration" basis with the transfer of the first group of long distance cables on 22 March 1946. Extensive installation and rehabilitation projects

were carried through, despite a continuing lack of trained personnel and the shortage of transport and equipment. In the second quarter of 1946, transfer of long lines and associated repeater stations to the German Reichspost relieved the Theater Signal Communications Service of much of its responsibility for signal plant development in occupied Germany.

113. Signal Communications Traffic.

Principal telephone switching centers were established during the late spring or summer of 1945 at Berlin, Bremen, Frankfurt, Kassel, Mannheim, Munich, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, and Heidelberg. Average daily peg counts increased from 13,801 in October to 20,040 in June. At the end of September 1945 the Frankfurt Signal Center was handling 3,800,000 teletype groups per week. During the week ending 26 January 1946 the total was 6,540,684. From this time on, teletype traffic steadily declined, and the number of groups for the week ending 29 June 1946 was 3,637,064.

114. The German Civil Communications Agency.

ECLIPSE signal instructions provided for Military Government control of the Reichspost to insure that communications needs of the military forces and of Military Government were met, and that essential communications were made available for German civilian use. After the surrender, civil communications were restored on a limited scale

under controls established by the G-2 and G-5 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters and the military Signal authorities. Reichspost employees, including released prisoners of war, were returned to their former posts when possible. Soon after V-E Day reorganization of the Reichspost in the United States and British Zones was undertaken on a regional basis. Military assistance given in the Eastern Military District included fuel, captured enemy material, and training of civilian switchboard operators. During 1946 long lines facilities in the United States Zone were transferred to the German Senior Directorate of Communications and Posts for operation under Military Government supervision and control. The Army thereafter obtained the greater part of its telephone service from the Reichspost on a preferred-customer basis.

115. Commercial Facilities.

Commercial telegraph companies were assisted in opening offices to handle press traffic and provide personal cable service for members of the occupation forces. Commercial transatlantic telephone service was added early in 1946. By the end of June 1946 requests were pending to establish twenty-nine commercial stations.

116. Special Projects.

The Signal Corps provided communications for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Department of State, the American Red Cross, and other agencies and governmental

departments. Special facilities were provided for the Potsdam Conference and the War Crimes Trials at Nürnberg. The Theater Chief Signal Officer assisted in planning communications requirements for the Constabulary and collaborated in technical planning for military police radio systems in Berlin, Munich, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, and Frankfurt. Agreements concerning interzonal circuits involved consultation with Signal staff officers at Theater level.

117. Signal Supply.

Repair and packaging of Signal supplies for shipment to the Pacific was a major supply problem from the end of hostilities in Europe until V-J Day. Redeployment of Signal troops caused large amounts of equipment which had been issued to units to accumulate in warehouses and depots. Shipments from depots in western Europe to the United States and to Germany continued throughout 1945, but was largely completed by the end of March 1946. Of an estimated total of 160,000 tons of surplus equipment, approximately 95 percent had been declared surplus by 31 March 1946. By the end of June, Signal depots held 141,671 tons of surplus property. Within Germany permanent signal depots were established at Mannheim, Nürnberg, and Neu Aubing. Disposal of captured enemy equipment and furnishing equipment required by the Constabulary were major supply projects during the first half of 1946.

118. Redeployment.

As of V-E Day there were approximately 75,000 Signal troops in the European Theater. By the end of July, 85 percent of the construction troops among the 33,000 Signal troops assigned to Communications Zone had been redeployed, and comparable losses had been suffered in depot and repair personnel. During the winter, critical shortages developed in repairmen, powermen, teletype mechanics, telephone repeatermen, and radio repairmen. Not enough replacements were received to fill shortages and many communications units were staffed with "branch immaterial" replacements whose only training was that received on the job. Employment of United States, Allied and German civilians went far toward meeting the shortages in operating personnel. The Theater Signal Corps School, established at Neuendetelsau in November 1945 and transferred to Ansbach in the spring of 1946, was one of the encouraging factors in the personnel situation during 1945-46.

REAL ESTATE AND CONSTRUCTION

119. Real Estate Holdings.

On V-E Day there were 58,688 pieces of real estate in the European Theater being held by the United States under requisition procedures which had been developed in the United Kingdom and revised during the campaign on the Continent. (11) Requisitioning of property

in the United Kingdom had partially ceased and property was being derequisitioned wherever possible. Donor nations pressed for return of property, and an investigation was conducted in September with a view to accelerating release. By 31 January 1946, 91 percent of the property which had been held in Belgium and 95 percent of that which had been held in France on the preceding 1 July had been derequisitioned.

120. Records.

Prior to August few records regarding requisitioned property were kept and town majors in the occupied areas sent requisition forms direct to the General Purchasing Agent's Office. In that month, C.E. Lloyd joined the Real Estate Branch of the Office of the Chief Engineer in Frankfurt and assembled records on property used in occupied territory. These showed that on 29 October 1945 United States forces were occupying 51,732 pieces of property in Germany, 1,904 in Czechoslovakia, and 1,496 in Austria.(12)

121. Redeployment Camps and Ports.

After V-E Day, first priority in construction was given to redeployment camps and to the rehabilitation of the Bremen and Bremerhaven ports. Eighteen camps with a total capacity of 249,000 were being constructed in the vicinity of Reims, three camps with a capacity of 17,000 in the vicinity of Marseille, and eleven camps with a capacity of 151,000 in the vicinity of Le Havre and Antwerp.

Two leave camps with a capacity of 10,000 built in Southampton, England, were converted into redeployment camps.

122. Procurement.

In April 1946 all purchases in Allied and neutral countries were placed on a cash basis. In Germany difficulty was encountered in procuring construction supplies because most German factories were short of coal, raw materials, and transportation; and few plants capable of producing the desired supplies were in operation.

Purchases in the various countries were as indicated below:

PURCHASES OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS IN 1946
(Approximate*)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1 Jan-31 Mar</u>	<u>1 Apr-30 Jun</u>
France	\$ 77,941	\$ 450,000
Belgium	6,642	400,000
Czechoslovakia	*	312,295
United Kingdom	*	170,000
Switzerland	*	2,013,232
Germany	886,599	1,161,986

* Exact figures not available for this study

123. Railroads.

Nearly all railroads of military value in the liberated countries were in operation by V-E Day and had been returned to civilian control. The U.S. Army had repaired or rebuilt the equivalent of 10,466 miles of single-track lines in liberated and occupied areas.

124. Waterways.

The clearance of the most important waterways of France and Belgium, such as the Seine, the Meuse, and the Albert Canal was a major task performed by the Army with the assistance of civilian engineer agencies. This work which consisted chiefly of removing demolished bridge spans and piers, had been substantially completed by May 1945 and responsibility for the waterways had been returned to the countries in which they were located. The inland waterways in the occupied area were rehabilitated by the German Inland Waterways administration under the supervision of the Theater Chief Engineer.

125. Highways.

By V-E Day U.S. Army troops, assisted by prisoners of war and civilians, had repaired and maintained a total of 7,688 miles of two-lane hard-surface highways in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg. The military highway network totaled 4,160 miles, of which 621 miles were under active maintenance. In the occupied area, highways were constructed and maintained by civilians under the supervision of Military Government. In liberated and occupied areas, 328 permanent-type highway bridges had been constructed.

126. Air Fields.

Some Allied governments complained of delay in the return of air fields and the matter was the subject of extended negotiations.

As of 30 June 1946, Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, controlled forty-one airports, of which thirty-eight were in the occupied area. All airports in the United Kingdom had been disposed of.

127. Hospitals.

After a survey in Germany and Austria, plans were made for twenty hospitals, including eight general hospitals of 1,000 beds, ten station hospitals of 750 beds each, one station hospital of 250 beds, and one station hospital of 150 beds. The total of 15,900 beds represented 4.3 percent of the planned troop population of 370,000 for the occupation forces. Seven of the sites selected already were hospitals. Construction standards were established on a 10-year operational basis, although construction materials to meet these standards were not available. The Engineer Corps supervised construction, using German and Austrian artisans. On 30 September 1945 fifteen of the hospitals were functioning, four others were opened on 10 December 1945; and the one at Bremen was placed in operation during January 1946. The institutions were opened, but much work remained to be done. Although several hospitals were closed and others reduced in size as the estimate of the strength of the occupation force was reduced, the construction program in June 1946 was only 77.9 percent complete.

128. Petroleum Pipelines.

Prior to May 1945, the Army had laid 1,306 miles of 4-inch

2,251 miles of 6-inch, and 19 miles of 10-inch petroleum pipelines. No pipes were laid after May. The daily capacity of storage tanks of the five systems of pipelines was equivalent to nearly as many barrels of oil products as were required by the U.S. Army for the entire period of World War I.

129. Ports.

The port of Bremerhaven was opened on 22 June 1945 when the first United States ship to enter the harbor unloaded 7,692 tons of cargo. Other ports were closed and returned to the donor nations as soon as Bremen and Bremerhaven were able to handle the incoming and outgoing cargo. The construction program adopted at Bremerhaven for the period of January to June 1946 called for 423,000 man-hours of labor and 1,210 long tons of supplies, but by June 1946 only 66,710 man-hours had been completed.

130. Military Communities and the General Construction Program.

a. On 19 September 1945 Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, created a special planning board to set standards for accommodations in military communities, and on 11 October 1945 tentative statements of standards were sent to major commands for consideration.(13) Technical standards for all types of housing, including recreational facilities, were the responsibility of the Theater Service Forces and the Theater Chief Engineer. On the basis of

findings of the Special Planning Board on Military Communities and the estimated requirements sent in by the major commands for general construction, the Theater Chief Engineer published the following construction program for the period of January 1946 to June 1947:

<u>Installations</u>	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Man-Hours</u>	<u>Long Tons of Supplies</u>
Military Communities		69,175,000	434,800
Headquarters		1,845,000	22,885
Command Schools		1,845,000	22,885
Hospitals		4,600,000	17,200
Depots		3,600,000	52,096
Shops		332,000	6,250
Special Installations		360,000	4,860
Bridges			
Highway		2,376,000	4,515
Railway		686,000	1,600
Railways		2,560,000	45,400
Highways		1,572,000	31,900
Utilities		2,760,000	38,200
Ports		432,000	1,210
Inland Waterways		400,000	25
TOTALS		92,543,000	683,826

b. By December 1946, military communities were 52.7 percent complete; depots 59.9 percent, hospitals 47 percent, air force technical facilities 48.6 percent, and special installations 51.9 percent. The tentative date for the completion of the construction program was set forward to January 1948.

c. Authorized special installations, including laundries, radio stations, beverage plants, receiver (wireless) sites, cold storage warehouses, reproduction plants, and schools, had used 487,792 man-hours of labor by June 1946 and were estimated as 86.7 percent complete.

The following list shows the number of man-hours spent in the construction program to the end of June 1946:

Military Communities and Camps	2,269,713
Headquarters	199,499
Command Schools	44,591
Hospitals	590,135
Depots and Shops	285,999
Special Installations	487,792
Utilities	41,992
Railway and Railway Bridges	10,795
Highway and Highway Bridges	86,671
Ports	66,710
Inland Waterways	
Miscellaneous	302,200
POL DEPOTS	<u>19,480</u>
Total	4,209,577

SURPLUS PROPERTY

131. Situation on V-E Day.

a. Production, storage, and eventual sale of vast amounts of United States property, manufactured as war material and lying idle in depots everywhere in the world, constituted a serious problem at the end of hostilities. The commanding general of the Communications Zone had been responsible during the war for disposal of certain surplus material throughout the European Theater of Operations; he in turn had delegated authority to the General Purchasing Agent, a member of his staff, who disposed of items excess to the needs of

the Theater upon completion of certain phases of combat, as well as that material considered excess through obsolescence. All other excess property in the Theater was reported to the War Department; after world-wide requirements had been determined, that which was not needed was declared as surplus to an authorized agency for disposal.(14)

b. As of 8 May 1945, the General Purchasing Agent was the only authority charged with the disposal of surplus material. He was negotiating with liberated countries to insure the proper use of scrap originating with the Army, as the scarcity of raw material was aggravated by widespread black-market trading in scrap in all the liberated countries.

132. Amount and Value of Surplus Property in the European Theater.

On 8 May 1945 no good estimates existed as to the amount and value of surplus property. All service chiefs were directed by the Theater Commander to determine their needs, coordinate with other services, fill their requirements from available stocks, and report any remainder as excess to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Even after this was done, no accurate estimate of the amount of surplus property was possible. Much later, it was estimated that the total amount of surplus property in the European Theater on V-E Day was 2,914,000 long tons, valued at \$2,228,000,000.

133. Establishment of Office of Army-Naval Liquidation Commissioner in the European Theater.

On 1 February 1945 the War and Navy Departments established the post of Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner and delegated to the holder the authority vested in the War and Navy Departments for disposal of surplus property outside the United States and its possessions, and for supervision of the settlement of claims based on contracts in foreign countries involving surplus property.(15) The following day the Commissioner appointed a representative, the Central Field Commissioner, for Europe, to whom he delegated authority to dispose of all United States surplus property in Europe and the United Kingdom.(16) At the request of the Central Field Commissioner in June 1946, the American Ambassador to France appointed agents of the State and Treasury Departments, Foreign Economic Administration, and Maritime Commission to act as an advisory council.

134. Agencies Participating in the Disposal of Surplus Property.

The General Purchasing Agent continued to operate a surplus property disposal agency under policies laid down by the Central Field Commissioner. The latter was responsible for fixing policy pertaining to disposal of surplus property, carrying on negotiations with United States government agencies and foreign countries, prescribing methods for handling and settling claims against the United States Government,

establishing prices, and issuing instructions concerning appraisals, fiscal records, and prices. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters, Communications Zone, was responsible for determining what property was surplus. The supply services were responsible for submitting to the General Purchasing Agent declarations of property as surplus, as well as for appraising, guarding, inspecting, and selling it. The Fiscal Director, Communications Zone, was responsible for receiving and accounting for funds collected from sales and for preparing reports required by the Theater Commander, the War Department, and the Central Field Commissioner.(17) Until November 1946 the General Purchasing Agent was responsible for reporting upon and supervising the activities of the supply services in carrying out the actual disposal of property.(18) In September 1945 the State Department was given the responsibility for disposal of surplus property, and the Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner was abolished. As of 6 November 1945, Headquarters, Central Field Commissioner for Europe, Office of Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner, became Headquarters, Central Field Commissioner for Europe, Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.(19)

135. Operations of Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner.

a. Field Commissioner Guide No. 1, published on 15 June 1945, stated that the prime objective of the program was to make the most advantageous sales within the regulations of the Surplus Property

Board. Proper channels for contacting governments were diplomatic missions and consular officers, who carried on negotiations in behalf on their governments. Sales were to be made first to purchasers able to pay immediately in United States dollars.(20) By January 1946, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) had bought surplus property worth \$60,000,000.

b. To make possible payment in United States currency, credits were established with European nations, especially the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. The last had a credit of \$45,000,000 from lend-lease transactions and was anxious to acquire surplus property. Sales on an over-the-counter basis to any purchaser who could qualify consisted mainly of jeeps, trucks, tires, and other items readily available in supply depots. In some instances it was necessary, because of lack of dollar purchasing power, to transfer certain installations and equipment to liberated governments on a loan or rental basis pending settlement at a governmental level. Transfers of the port facilities at Cherbourg, was an instance of this.

136. Procedure in Disposal of Surplus Property.

a. Criteria for Identifying Property as Excess. Specific criteria were set up for identifying property as excess; exceptions to these were some categories which could be declared surplus automatically, such as items not appropriate to the climate and shipped inadvertently to the Theater.(21)

b. Power of the Theater Commander. The Theater Commander was authorized to declare surplus all items for which there was a commerical equivalent or civilian market, and also perishable subsistence items or other property prompt disposal of which was necessary to avoid spoilage or loss through rapid deterioration. No items of purely military value for which there was no commerical equivalent or civilian market, or any nonperishable subsistence items, were to be termed surplus by the Theater Commander without War Department authorization.

c. Responsibilities of Supply Services. Chiefs of supply services were responsible for determining requirements for materials furnished by their services and for coordinating with other services in order to make available to them any excess in their services.(22) Property determined to be surplus was their sole responsibility until it was delivered to purchasers. All echelons of the services were responsible for collecting,maintaining, guarding, reporting, and moving all surplus property supplied by their services, as well as reconditioning repairable items. When necessary, they were to use troops to determine serviceability and condition of materials. A designated officer remitted proceeds to a disbursing finance office.(23)

137. Handling of Surplus Property before Delivery to Purchaser.

a. Procedure in Collection and Identification of Excess Property. The first step was to collect into depots all property

appearing to be excess. Property subject to collection included items not yet issued, equipment in the hands of using troops and property turned in by inactivated units. Rapid deployment greatly hampered collection, segregation, and marking of all of this material. Inactivation of increasing numbers of units multiplied the quantities to be handled, and make it impossible to prepare accurate inventories and to label the property.(24) Occasionally, new material found its way into scrap heaps, and was likely to be sold at great loss to the government.(25) As late as June 1946, errors as high as 50 percent were revealed in inventories. New inventories were essential. The G-4 Division was constantly concerned with remedying the situation.(26)

b. Storage of Surplus Property. Property turned in by inactivated units increased daily. Storage space decreased alarmingly owing partly to demands by liberated countries for the return of storage facilities. It was imperative to obtain as much storage space as possible in Germany. Items least affected by weather were diverted to uncovered stands.

c. Documentation of Shipments of Surplus Property. Installations responsible for shipping surplus property prepared waybills and issued vouchers and other documents required for movement.(27) The consignee provided and paid for transportation, except in the case of reciprocal aid property or decision of the General Purchasing Agent that it was to the best interest of the Theater to provide transportation.

d. Guarding Surplus Property. Redeployment caused a shortage of manpower for the guarding of surplus property in storage and transit. Polish guard companies proved not entirely satisfactory and were replaced where possible by United States troops. Guarding and maintenance costs borne by the Army were estimated at \$3.90 per ton per month.(28)

e. Accounting, Reports, and Records. Technical Manual 38-420 prescribed methods of accounting, handling financial transactions, and filing reports and records.

f. Maintenance of Surplus Property. Redeployment also affected the maintenance of surplus property. Equipment turned in uncleaned and unprepared for storage deteriorated rapidly. Training of German civilians partially solved the problem, and every effort was made to deliver surpluses sold as speedily as possible.

137. Progress on the Continent.

By the middle of November 1945, surplus property disposal centers had been established in France at Reims, Metz, Charleville, and Juvincourt, and by the end of November approximately 75,000 tons of material had been shipped to the Zone of Interior from Marseille alone. Officials felt that the program was moving well. The program included the shipment for distribution through UNRRA, of 975 vehicles and equipment for two hospitals to Czechoslovakia, and equipment for twelve hospitals to Poland.(29) In November 1945 the War Department

was in the process of turning over to various countries and to UNRRA 51,000,000 pounds of canned meat.(30)

138. Ordnance.

As of 2 November 1945, 453,000 tons of ammunition had been shipped from the Theater; 380,000 tons of the remainder were to be shipped to the United States by the first of the year if ships could be obtained. It was expected that approximately 208,000 tons of explosives in France and Belgium would be sold. If the sale was not accomplished, 134,000 tons could be dumped at sea, 42,000 tons burned, and 54,000 tons disassembled.(31) It was, however, difficult to find old hulks for the purpose of dumping excess ammunition, since most outmoded naval units could still be used for other purposes.

139. Medical.

Disposal of the approximately \$85,000,000 of surplus and excess medical stores was a command and staff concern. Of the \$31,000,000 surplus, \$1,155,000 worth was disposed of to buyers.(32) Excess supplies were to be returned to America.

140. Signal.

By early December 1945, 30,000 tons of Signal equipment, to be held in Theater reserve, were ready to be shipped to locations in Germany; 60,000 tons were to be shipped to the United States; and 110,000 tons were to be declared surplus.

141. Surplus Post Exchange Items.

Post exchanges began to experience difficulty in disposing of some items after hostilities ended. The War Department policy that certain excesses would be shipped to the United States was changed on 1 December 1945, after which date no excesses could be returned to the United States. Army Exchange officials estimated that the major portion of post exchange equipment not required for operations in Germany could be disposed of by 1 February 1946.

142. Sale of Surplus Items to Members of the Armed Forces.

In November 1945 it was expected that certain items in demand by soldiers, such as barometers, magnifying glasses, electrical spotlights, and telegraph sets, would be requisitioned by the Army Exchange Service with payment direct to the United States Treasury.

143. Situation at the End of 1945.

By December 1945 the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner reported that, of all the property to be disposed of in liberated countries, only about one-fourth had been declared to him. In Great Britain, only a few items of surplus property remained to be declared at the end of the year. Shipping shortages caused a serious lag in shipments to the United States. More than half of the surplus already shipped from the Continent was ammunition, with vehicles and

wheeled equipment making up the bulk of the remainder. Equipment disposed of locally was small in quantity. Chiefs of services were asked to speed up movement of supplies to ports. Delta Base Section had on hand in the middle of December 591,000 tons of material, of which only 7.7 percent had been declared surplus by chiefs of services, Redeployment, taking manpower from the depots, delayed the shipment to the United States of the scheduled 12 percent.

144. United Kingdom.

The Central Field Commissioner was held responsible for the disposal of all surplus property in the United Kingdom on a bulk basis in settlement of lend-lease accounts. In the middle of December, United States property in British depots totaled 156,286 tons; material awaiting shipment to the United States totaled 19,113 tons, and to the Continent, 28,775 tons.

145. Recovery of Property from Air Force Installations.

By the end of 1945 thirty abandoned air fields were surveyed with disappointing results, as few items of worth were discovered. The same situation held throughout the Theater.

146. Disposal of Scrap.

By early January 1946, scrap tonnages in Theater Service Forces depots amounted to 13,000 tons--all but 1,000 tons being Ordnance material. Thirty-five thousand tons were available in

Air Force depots. Disposal of scrap in Great Britain was well-organized. Theater Service Forces staff members desired to set up a similar system in France, but were hindered by French unwillingness to pay cash for the material. Pending instructions from Washington, it was finally decided that scrap would be collected around main seaports such as Antwerp, then transshipped from barges to ships and used as ballast in transatlantic shipping operations.(33)

147. Negotiations for the Sale of Rhone Valley Pipe Line.

The Rhone Valley Pipe Line, running 550 miles from L'Avera (Marseille area) to Saarburg, France, was a \$9,000,000 installation awaiting disposition at the end of the war. After varied and contradictory proposals and decisions which caused expensive delays and involved the War and State Departments both politically and financially, and France, Switzerland, and Argentina as well, the pipe line was dismantled and its material scattered among several depots, where it was mixed with other pipe-line parts and finally sold to individuals and a few European countries.(34)

148. Negotiations for the Sale of Surplus Rolling Stock.

a. Numerous and varied propositions for the purchase of the thousands of United States freight and tank cars and locomotives were made by UNRRA, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other willing purchasers. Negotiations were halted when the Transportation Corps

announced in early December 1945 that rolling stock was no longer classified surplus. The reason for this was that French-owned rolling stock in use in Germany during hostilities was returned to France, leading to a severe rolling-stock shortage in Germany. After a few weeks, great quantities of rolling stock were again returned to the surplus list.

b. About half of the \$60,000,000 spent by UNRRA for surplus goods to be used in relief and rehabilitation work in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans, had gone for transportation equipment needed in distribution work; included in this were 200 locomotives, and railroad equipment for maintenance and repair. By May 1946 all but sixty United States-owned locomotives had been declared surplus; forty of these had been loaned to Austria, and twenty were in use in Czechoslovakia. Little progress had been made in completing the sale of surplus locomotives, but all other surplus rolling stock had been disposed of with the exception of some cabooses.

149. Property Disposal Status in January 1946.

Segregation of materials was virtually complete by middle January 1946. Reciprocal-aid property remaining in England was returned to the British Government by 1 February.

150. Causes of Delays.

Delays in disposal were charged to a number of causes--failure to provide disposal instructions, discrepancies in transfer

of depot stock figures, delays in counting of material in the various depots, poor mail service in France.

151. Charges of Wasteful Destruction.

Charges of wasteful destruction, upon investigation, were found groundless in every reported instance. By the middle of January, Western Base Section had sent to all units in the field information on the degree to which property might be destroyed, but units were advised to contact ~~the~~ mayor of the nearest town to determine whether the property might be of benefit to the civilian population.

152. Disposal of German Ammunition.

By 18 January 1946 the United States had destroyed 450,000 tons of German ammunition and had authorized the destruction of 400,000 more. French unwillingness to pay for German ammunition, together with difficulties of transport to France, resulted in the report in January 1946 that no ammunition had been shipped to liberated areas.

153. Negotiations with Various Countries and Agencies for Sales in Bulk.

On 15 February 1946 Norway and Finland agreed to purchase the property of Task Force A, formerly located in Norway.(35) An agreement of 25 February 1946 between the Central Field Commissioner and the Joint Procurement Mission, a charitable organization, authorized

purchase by the latter of surplus property in the Theater.(36)

Credits for the purchase of surplus property were granted, as follows: Poland--\$50,000,000; Hungary--\$10,000,000; and the American Joint Distribution Committee--\$5,000,000. The Central Field Commissioner was authorized to exchange surplus property for real estate for diplomatic purposes in Europe. A United States-French Joint Agreement of 28 May 1946 provided for the sale in bulk of surplus property estimated to have cost originally \$1,500,000,000. By 30 June 1946 no conclusions had been reached in discussions between Belgium and the United States regarding the 822,000 tons of surplus property valued at \$526,783,410, then located in Belgium.(37) By 30 June 1946, the sale in bulk to Great Britain was well on its way to completion after more than six months of negotiation.

154. Status as of 30 June 1946.

Only a small amount of material had been delivered to France, and none of the property ultimately to be delivered to Belgium had been transferred. Of the approximately 2,914,000 long tons of material on hand in the European Theater on V-E Day, which was ultimately to be declared surplus, 2,295,000 long tons worth \$1,590,000,000, had been declared by 30 June 1946. The value of the 619,000 long tons still undeclared was set at \$698,000,000. Up to 30 June 1946, operations of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner had resulted in the disposal of 943,000 tons of material which brought \$758,000,000 in world markets.(38)

CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIAL

155. Handling of Captured Material during the Campaign.

a. Prior to the German surrender, the Supreme Commander was authorized to use, for the forces under his command and for equipping national forces in European countries, both surrendered and captured equipment.(39) If he could not use it, he was authorized to destroy it or to reduce it to scrap. Material of interest for intelligence or for scientific or military research was to be carefully guarded and its existence and location reported, for purposes of immediate exploitation, to the Combined Intelligence Subcommittee. Final disposition was to be directed by the Allied Control Council when that body assumed control of the conquered territory.

b. It was believed that some captured material could be used in the prosecution of the war against Germany and Japan. An international board, the London Munitions Assignment Board, studied the needs of the Japanese War with a view to making allotments against the captured material.(40) Expendable items such as food, petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL), medical supplies, and clothing could be used to support the disarmed German Army or funneled into civil affairs channels for use in relief of civilian distress. Frequently, considerable time elapsed between the capture of material and the establishment of control over it by the supply authorities. Haphazard handling of parts, souvenir hunting, lack of trained technical personnel, and inadequate security hampered exploitation of the material.(41)

156. Captured Material in Liberated Countries.

Enemy war material found in liberated countries was divided into three categories. Category "A" consisted of material of local origin used by the Germans for military purposes; Category "B", material ordered produced in the liberated countries by German military authorities; and Category "C", all other material, including that of German origin brought into liberated countries. Material in all three categories surplus to the demands of Supreme Headquarters and the London Munitions Assignment Board was eventually to be turned over to the country where it was found. In the case of Category "A" property, the process was almost automatic; screening for other demands became progressively greater in the cases of "B" and "C" items. All "C" material was assumed to be the property of the United Nations rather than of the country where found, though it was normally turned over to that country if it had no direct military use.(42)

157. Administrative Procedures Used by the Armies.

Procedures of the several armies for reporting, classifying, safeguarding, and using captured enemy material were generally uniform, conforming to the "Standing Operating Procedure for Maintenance and Salvage" published by Theater Headquarters. Except for technical intelligence teams of the Air Forces and Theater Service Forces, and the special intelligence agencies of Supreme Headquarters no organized

personnel was provided to deal with captured material. Its use was coordinated by subsections of army and higher echelons supply staffs. Thus, the Quartermaster was charged with locating, safeguarding, classifying, and inventorying all Quartermaster-type material in the army area, as well as maintaining records of all inventories, transfers, and releases. He was not charged with physical transfer of the property. Technical personnel of maintenance, repair, and service organizations working with the armies inspected captured materials and reported their intelligence possibilities. Detachments of technical intelligence sections of Communications Zone were attached to the armies, usually operating at corps headquarters. Scientific and economic representatives from higher headquarters were generally interested in targets which had no immediate interest to the army.

158. Kinds of Stores and Equipment Captured and Their Use.

Class I ration dumps were captured as the armies advanced through France. Many of these were in underground storage, therefore well preserved. Class II and III supplies constituted the bulk of captured enemy material and, next to Class V, offered the greatest difficulties in disposal. Captured American- and British-manufactured vehicles were used to augment both field and service force transport. Unserviceable vehicles and many types of enemy combat vehicles were destroyed to prevent their use by hostile groups which had been

by-passed. Considerable quantities of captured construction materials substantially augmented similar supplies of the U.S. Army. Enemy tools and equipment taken in occupied countries and Germany were used if possible; if not required by the United States forces, they were returned to their original owners (if these were nationals of liberated countries) or to their governments. Captured bridge materials, specifically bridge dumps, aided greatly in rapid bridge construction. Captured electric generators formed a valuable complement to those possessed by the forces. Captured railway locomotives, cars, trackage, and shops, both enemy and those belonging to the liberated nations, were important to the transportation service. Insofar as possible, captured ammunition was concentrated in a few dumps, where certain types were made available to recognized resistance groups in liberated countries. United States sentries were required for security of the dumps. Chemical Warfare Supply Class V was a major problem; toxic gases had to be carefully guarded until neutralized or dropped at sea. Ordnance Class V could be disposed of by detonation in small quantities.

. 159. Activities Subsequent to V-E Day.

After V-E Day commanders in the field were concerned with searching their areas for by-passed installations, concentrating scattered stocks into central locations, and destroying material prejudicial to military security and public safety. Stores of

captured enemy material represented both an asset and a problem in the supply picture.(43) Problems of collection and disposal of this material were complicated by the fact that they were Allied rather than strictly American problems; handling had to be governed by Supreme Headquarters instructions so long as that body was in existence, and afterward by governments on a political level. Authorization for commanders to destroy war material or reduce it to scrap lapsed on V-E Day.(44) Instructions issued on 6 August 1945 by Theater Headquarters indicated that army commanders would be responsible for the proper use and disposal of captured material, and that they could retain and use such material as required by the army, with the exception of items required for technical research; the rest they were not to destroy or reduce to scrap until further orders.(45)

160. Allocation of Material for Use in the Pacific Theater.

Immediately following the end of hostilities in Europe, some captured enemy material was set aside to meet assignment lists of the London Munitions Assignment Board. Plans were made to ship this material to the Pacific, but Japan's surrender halted the program.(46)

161. Decisions of the Potsdam Conference.

At the Tripartite Conference held at Potsdam 17 July-2 August 1945, it was decided that all arms, ammunition, and implements of war,

and all specialized facilities for their production, would be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed, and that the maintenance and production of all aircraft, arms, ammunition, and implements of war by Germany would be prevented. The three governments agreed to appoint experts to work out detailed plans for the program. Use and disposal of surrendered German war and merchant ships was agreed upon.

162. Transfer of Administrative Responsibility.

Executive Order N. 9630 of 27 September 1945 transferred to the Department of State all functions of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission and of the War and Navy Departments relating to the disposition abroad of property captured from the enemy.

163. Inventory of Captured Enemy Material.

On 10 August 1945 an inventory of serviceable war material on hand was forwarded to the War Department. This was about 50 percent of known enemy war material in Germany and Austria at the time. New dumps and caches of supplies were being uncovered daily.(47)

164. Use of Captured Enemy Material.

Considerable amounts of various kinds of property were used by the United States forces for the maintenance of prisoners of war, disarmed enemy forces, and displaced persons. Substantial quantities, including a large number of vehicles, were turned over to the military

government authorities for distribution to civil agencies and civilians.

165. Field Force Activity.

All captured enemy material had to be stored and guarded--a considerable burden for a force rapidly losing vital strength through redeployment.(48) Nevertheless, the process of taking inventory of unserviceable enemy war material continued satisfactorily. It was hoped that pending negotiations dealing with destruction of all unneeded war material would effect complete elimination of this material as a war potential.(49) Lists of war material required in the United States for postwar study, and as war memorials and trophies, were issued and instructions given to collect and ship this material.(50)

166. Responsibility for Air Force Material.

On 28 December 1945 the U.S. Air Forces in Europe was advised that the U.S. Forces, European Theater, would take over responsibility for enemy material peculiar to the Air Forces. A coordinating committee was to administer the program.

167. Captured Enemy Material to be Treated as Surplus Property.

On 10 January 1946 the War Department directed that German war material other than aircraft, and surplus to Theater requirements be processed in the same manner as surplus property.(51) Chiefs of supply services were to declare to the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner

all captured German war material surplus to Theater needs. Prisoners of war were to be screened for personnel familiar with handling ammunition.

168. Reduction of Material to Scrap.

Although on 22 October 1945 Theater Headquarters directed the responsible commanders to proceed with the destruction of German war materials, a War Department cable of 31 October directed that destruction in areas occupied by United States forces should be halted until such time as new instructions were received. After weeks of inactivity the Theater Commander directed an inquiry to the War Department and received the answer that continued destruction of war material dangerous to public or military security was still authorized.(52) It was estimated that it would take three years to destroy the approximately 175,000 long tons of ammunition on hand in the Third Army area in January 1946. Dumping at sea where possible was advocated by Third Army.(53) On 21 February 1946 Theater Headquarters authorized major commands to begin destruction of all enemy ground forces material of a warlike nature, with the proviso that the destruction not be undertaken until all Theater requirements for such material had been determined by Theater chiefs of technical services.(54) In March authority to dispose of captured enemy ammunition to Allied nations as hazardous scrap was refused by the War Department on the objection of the State Department. On 28 May

1946 a meeting between representatives of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) (OMGUS) and German officials resulted in tentative plans to turn over all remaining captured enemy ammunition to OMGUS for demilitarization and salvage of component parts for use in the German economy. The Theater disposal program then ceased, except for a small amount of scuttling. It was expected that demilitarization of all captured enemy ammunition would be accomplished prior to 30 June 1947.(55)

MEDICAL POLICIES AND OPERATIONS

169. The System.

a. The whole vast medical system in the European Theater was guided by the Theater Chief Surgeon and his staff. Policies affecting the American forces emanated from his office, which was organized in special divisions, including operations, evacuation, hospitalization, professional services, preventive medicine, dental, nursing, veterinary, supply, and medical intelligence.

b. On V-E Day there was on duty a body of some 15,700 Medical Corps officers, 170 Veterinary Corps officers, 500 Sanitary Corps officers, 350 physical therapy aides, 470 hospital dieticians, 17,900 nurses, and 212,000 enlisted men. In addition, approximately

17,000 civilians of western European countries and thousands of German prisoners of war were employed.

170. Transition from Combat Conditions.

After hostilities ended and treatment of battle casualties fell off, there was a marked increase in the number of medical patients, and many soldiers had to have surgery as the result of motor vehicle accidents.

171. Redeployment.

Medical units first had to be categorized in the four redeployment categories set by Theater Headquarters. Then individual officers and enlisted men had to be "adjusted" on the basis of the adjusted service rating scores and then shipped to the Pacific, directly or indirectly, or to the Zone of the Interior for a strategic reserve or for discharge, or kept in Europe for the forces of occupation and the closing-out forces in liberated countries. General and station hospitals--which were called fixed hospitals, to distinguish them from the more mobile field and evacuation hospitals--were closed out more rapidly in the United Kingdom and more slowly in western Europe, and gradually grew in number in the occupied areas of Germany and Austria. Medical units were redeployment on the basis of the Theater's bed requirements estimated at 6 percent of the total troop strength on V-E Day, 5 percent on V-E-plus-60-day, and 4 percent on V-E-plus-90-day.

172. Readjustment.

The readjustment of individuals after V-E Day was begun on the assumption that a soldier or officer whose adjusted service rating score was eighty-five or higher and a nurse with a score above fifty-five was eligible for discharge from the military service. Thus, personnel with the lowest scores and those who possessed professional skills which the War Department declared essential to its needs were assigned to units leaving for the Far East.

173. Records.

Although, on the whole, the redeployment and readjustment of officers and men proceeded with all the efficiency and speed possible under prevailing conditions, a number of unavoidable hardships and maladjustments in individual cases occurred. Some of these resulted from the failure of the machine records unit to have a roster giving up-to-date information on the adjusted service rating scores of all Medical Department personnel. Only 60 percent of the machine records unit's roster was correct. Officers whose adjusted service ratings did not appear, even though they met all the necessary qualifications for redeployment, were not redeployed for separation until much later. Other difficulties were encountered when each major command was authorized to make personnel adjustments within its own jurisdiction. When the supply of qualified officers became exhausted, in a command, it had to appeal to the Theater Surgeon to

supply its deficiencies. Soon an attempt was made to have commands trade personnel on a voluntary basis. When that failed, a card file was established for each medical officer in the Theater. This proved to be, in spite of some shortcomings, the most workable means of reconstituting medical units on the basis of the four redeployment categories.

174. Capacity.

Just before V-J Day, 66 general and station hospitals provided close to 58,000 beds, of which 28,000 were occupied by patients. Numerous mobile units provided additional medical service to the large bodies of troops in the staging and assembly areas of the Assembly Area Command. Extensive hospital facilities had to be provided also for German prisoners of war, recovered Allied military personnel, and displaced persons. Patients in these categories totaled as many as 450,000 in May and some 103,000 by V-J Day.

175. Evacuation.

a. The evacuation of hospitalized military personnel was at first based on a 60-day policy, which, together with a liberal availability of sea and air lift, made possible the evacuation of 41,600 patients in May and some 21,700 in July. With the inauguration of a 120-day policy, evacuation tapered off to approximately 9,500 patients during August.

b. Cherbourg and Southampton were first the principal ports through which patients were evacuated to the Zone of the Interior. When the line of communications was shifted to Germany, however, Bremen and Bremerhaven became the main ports of evacuation. Patients whose condition called for air evacuation were flown from Orly Field in Paris. Hospital trains traversed western Europe, carrying patients from hospital to hospital and from hospital to port. The transfer of hospitalized prisoners of war at times made up the majority of hospital train moves. This was true in the autumn of 1945, when approximately 16,000 were moved from France to Germany and from Bremerhaven on their arrival from Norway.

c. The reduced troop strength and the 120-day hospitalization policy reduced the scale of evacuation operations in 1946. One ship a month provided sufficient sea lift to handle all evacuation in the spring. This was supplemented by an air lift of one plane a month. A patient who needed to be evacuated to the Zone of the Interior had to wait no more than thirty days for transportation. On the Continent, Diesel auto-rail cars were used in addition to hospital trains. Over 5,000 U.S. Army patients and some 19,000 sick prisoners of war were transported by rail during the first six months of 1946.

176. Health of the Command.

The health of American troops during the months between

V-E Day and V-J Day was, on the whole, excellent. With the exception of venereal disease, there was a low incidence of communicable disease. No major problem existed, although infectious hepatitis showed an incidence somewhat above normal. Common respiratory disease, which failed to show a seasonal rise until late in November 1945, rose to 175 per thousand per annum in March 1946 and then declined to 83 in June. Although considered normal, the average rate for 1946 remained far above that for the corresponding period of the year before--a fact attributed to the youthfulness of the new draftees who were replacing the battle-hardened veterans. Primary and atypical pneumonia presented no special problems. Influenza did not become troublesome, as some medical authorities feared. Diphtheria, reported from scattered places throughout the Theater, was no more prevalent in Europe than in the United States and no clinical differences existed. It showed generally a fatality rate of below 2 percent. The diagnosis and therapy of this disease proved in some ways confusing late in 1945, a difficulty that was in part attributable to the use of penicillin, which served to mask the local manifestations of the disease. Of the intestinal disease--typhoid and paratyphoid--only sporadic cases were reported. Dysentery infections were on a low level, and outbreaks of common diarrhea were infrequent. The incidence of such communicable diseases as scarlet fever, measles, and German measles was low. On the other hand, scabies, which was widespread in the German population, was similarly widespread among United States

troops--one of the results of association with German women.

177. Venereal Disease.

a. Without question, the most serious medical problem with which the U.S. Army in Europe was faced was the control of the venereal diseases. Only where strong measures to repress clandestine prostitution were instituted did the incidence of the diseases remain within reasonable bounds. In other areas the policy of nonfraternization, educational programs, increased recreational facilities, and a wide set of prophylactic stations failed to check the contraction by United States troops of gonorrhea and syphilis. Leave centers and redeployment areas were the heaviest contributors to the number of infections, Paris and Marseille alone contributing some 48 percent of all cases contracted in France. One-half of all the infections in the Theater were contracted in France just prior to V-J Day. A little over one-third of all the infections were contracted in Germany.

b. From a rate of below 50 per 1,000 per annum during the last weeks of combat, the incidence of the venereal diseases rose to 182 in October and 251 in December, reaching a peak of 264 in June 1946. The rates of infection in Negro troops were particularly high throughout the entire year of the occupation. Whereas, for example, the white rate of the Theater's high week (ending 21 December) in 1945 stood at 179 per thousand per annum, the Negro rate stood at 1,029; and, when the over-all Theater peak of 264 was reached during

the week ending 14 June 1946, the Negro rate was at 895 and the white rate at 197. The Negro rate never fell below 512 per thousand per annum; the white rate never rose above 197.

c. All major commands contributed to the high rate of venereal disease. In 1945, when large bodies of American troops passed through the redeployment camps in France, that country contributed close to 46 percent of the total incidence, or over 56,300 infections from July through December 1945. Germany became the chief country of infection when troop concentrations shifted to that area in 1946.

d. Penicillin was provided to German civil authorities and all German physicians and diagnostic and treatment centers were instructed to report all cases of venereal infection coming to their attention.

178. Administration Subsequent to V-J Day.

A new period in Theater administration was entered when V-J Day was announced. Although redeployment was still the biggest task that confronted the Army in Europe, all operations began to be conducted with an eye to the long-range occupation of Germany. Phasing out of liquidation force medical installations was accelerated and planned hospitalization facilities for the forces of occupation in German and Austria were reduced. Responsibility for fixed hospital installations, base filler medical depots, and captured enemy medical

supply dumps was transferred from the Surgeons of the two Military Districts to Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, and at the end of 1945 to the Theater Surgeon. Some functions, however, were decentralized--rather than centralized--the newly activated Continental Base Section was charged with the responsibility of medical supply to the forces of occupation and of operations in the fields of hospitalization and evacuation. In June 1946 the West African District's medical facilities and problems were integrated with those of the rest of the Theater. The adjustment of individual officers and enlisted men of the Medical Department became the responsibility of the Theater Surgeon.

179. Supplies.

To keep medical supplies and equipment constantly flowing to where they were needed, a network of medical supply depots, filler depots, and base depots was maintained. This was gradually reduced until there were only a few consolidated depots by the end of June 1946. A reorder point of 180 days was established, which was based upon an authorized 60-day level of stocks on hand plus a 120-day allowance to provide for ordering and shipping time from the date of the depot inventories to the actual receipt of stocks from the Zone of the Interior. To build up levels of reserve in all medical depots in Germany, large stocks were transferred from depots in liberated countries. Supplies not needed for the forces of occupation

were declared surplus and turned over to the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. Large stocks of medical supplies especially designated for Civil Affairs and Military Government were issued to civil authorities as the situation demanded.

180. Hospitalization.

The U.S. Army's medical and dental facilities in the European Theater were made available to all members of the armed forces and their dependents; to all personnel of the armed forces of the Allies in United States areas of occupation when medical facilities of their own national government were not available; to employees of the American Red Cross and UNRRA; to United States and United Nations citizens employed by the United States Government; and to citizens of the United States who were not employees of the Government but were in the Theater on officially authorized missions. Patients who needed no more than 72-hours' hospitalization were usually confined to general dispensaries. Field and evacuation hospitals provided 30-days' hospitalization, and station and general hospitals provided hospitalization of from 30 to 120 days. At the end of June 1946, thirty-six hospitals were in operation in the European Theater, with a total of some 5,600 patients.

181. Prisoners of War.

The hospitalization of German prisoners of war was the responsibility of the military medical authorities in the Theater.

A number of prisoner-of-war general and station hospitals were maintained, staffed by German doctors and nurses under the supervision of U.S. Army medical officers. Similar medical responsibility was exercised over hospitals and dispensaries in displaced persons camps.

182. Nutrition.

Placing all troops on a peacetime diet became an important responsibility of the Theater Surgeon. For a time after V-E Day the reduced troop strength created excess stocks of food of the "C" and "K" ration types, which had to be integrated into the troop menus. Importance of replacement, wherever possible, of the preserved and dessicated items of the ration with increased quantities of fresh fruit and vegetables, frozen fresh meat, and shell eggs was stressed, however. Special diets were prepared for patients in hospitals who needed specific dietary therapy. Army nutrition experts studied the nutritional status of recovered Allied military personnel and made recommendations concerning the necessary preventive and therapeutic measures required for proper nutritional management in both medical and nonmedical cases. Special rations were prepared for German prisoners of war. The nutritional state of the command in the Theater continued good throughout the first year of the occupation. The caloric intake was adequate. The rations for both troops and civilians employed by the army improved with time and the number and types of food items increased. The feeding of prisoners of war

and enemy civilian internees presented some problems, since a large proportion of them suffered from malnutrition. Displaced persons fared well nutritionally, being provided a diet of 3,000 calories per day.

183. Sanitation.

Special problems of sanitation arose first in connection with redeployment and later in establishing military communities to house the families of personnel making up the forces of occupation. A gradual shift took place from the treatment of water by field methods to the use of properly treated municipal supplies as repairs to war-damaged distribution systems progressed. Likewise, pit latrines gave way to waterflushed toilet facilities. Damaged sewer systems were reconstructed. Garbage and rubbish were disposed of either in existing civilian dumps or in sanitary fills.

184. Typhus in the Civil Population.

The most serious public health threat was the louse, transmitter of typhus. To check its spread, particularly in the immediate posthostilities months, when hundreds of thousands of displaced persons trekked across Europe, the U.S. Army's medical authorities had all people moving into and out of Germany through the border control points sprayed with DDT powder. A similar procedure was followed when check points were established at crossings of the

Rhine, and the river was made a cordon sanitaire against the migration of the body louse from one part of Germany to another. Chief foci of typhus infection were the concentration camps, especially Dachau and Mauthausen. Field teams, supplied to lower medical units by the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon, were used widely in investigating reported cases of typhus and in discovering unsuspected ones.

185. Tuberculosis among Displaced Persons.

The prevalence of tuberculosis in displaced persons camps seriously affected the health of the population of occupied Germany. U.S. Army medical officers were faced with the stupendous problem of X-raying entire groups of people for identification, diagnosis, and therapy. Those suffering from the disease were treated by the latest methods.

186. Food for the Civil Population.

The lack of food constituted potentially the greatest single menace to public health in the occupied areas of German and Austria. This was true particularly in industrial areas, where hard work and little nourishment reduced the resistance to disease to dangerously low levels.

187. Professional Services.

To enable the Theater Chief Surgeon to maintain high standards

of professional service in military medical installations, his staff included consultants in orthopedic and plastic surgery, infectious diseases, tuberculosis urology, neuropsychiatry, and other specialties, who acted as technical advisers in the various fields of surgery and medicine. When redeployment drastically depleted the staff, the number of consultants was reduced proportionately until by June 1946 only the consultants in surgery and medicine remained.

188. Dental Service.

A particularly heavy load was thrown on the Dental Corps when fighting came to an end. In redeployment staging areas large dental clinics were organized, which were to a considerable extent staffed by officers who were themselves awaiting redeployment. For troops remaining with the forces of occupation, dental clinics were established in important cities in and near which there were heavy troop concentrations.

189. Veterinary Service.

a. The chief function of the Veterinary Corps was to inspect the tons of food which the forces consumed. Although, like the other branches of the medical service, the Veterinary Corps worked with a shortage of officers and enlisted men, it accomplished prodigious tasks. Several billions of pounds of meat products and hundreds of millions of pounds of nonanimal products were inspected.

Chapter XV
CIVIL AFFAIRS

STAFF RELATIONSHIPS IN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNDER
THE G-5 DIVISION

191. Early Developments.

a. To administer enemy territory and to aid in the re-establishment of civil government in liberated countries, the Civil Affairs Division of the Supreme Allied Command was reorganized as the G-5 Division of the general staff of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force on 15 February 1944, with thirty-five officers allotted to it.(1) The G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters became the policy-making and coordinating body on all matters pertaining to civil affairs in liberated countries and to military government in occupied territory. As originally established, the Division comprised the following sections: Fiscal, Legal, Supply, Economics,

Civil Affairs Operations, and Staff Duties. A Special Staff Division on civil affairs was also instituted outside the framework of the G-5 organization; (2) this unit was later fused with the United States element of the Allied Control Authority in Berlin. A Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer directed activities of the Special Staff Division. His duties included supervising the training schools, controlling the Country Sections, which were set up for the liberated countries as well as for Germany, and commanding the rear echelon of the G-5 Division. When the United States Group Control Council took over the functions of the Special Staff Division on civil affairs, the Country Sections were placed under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, for operations and planning.

b. It was the expressed desire of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander that the civil affairs organization should be closely integrated with the regular military staff throughout the chain of command. Not only at the level of Supreme Headquarters, but also in lower echelons, the G-5 Division became an integral part of the Army organization. Civil affairs and military government staffs were authorized general staff status in armies and corps on 3 May 1944, and the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was accordingly established at those headquarters. As new armies and corps were activated in the Theater thereafter, their tables of organization included provisions for G-5 Divisions.

192. G-5 Structure in the Spring of 1945.

a. On 7 May 1945, the functional pattern for the G-5 staffs at the various command levels was prescribed in Appendix "G" to SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 39.(3) This plan of organization divided staff functions according to the following sections: internal affairs; economics; displaced persons, refugees, and welfare; legal and financial; and reparations, deliveries, and restitutions. This plan was followed rather closely at all echelons of the command, with minor deviations to permit adjustment to varying local conditions.

b. On V-E Day the strength of the G-5 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters and the various subordinate commands was as follows:

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
SHAEF	120	5	148
Com Z	31		39
Base Sections	63		77
12th Army Group	67	1	82
First US Army	31		44
Third U.S. Army	24	1	40
Ninth U.S. Army	28	1	47
Fifteenth U.S. Army	32	1	31
Corps (Fifteenth Army)	39		43
Division (Fifteenth Army)	201		267
6th Army Group	40	1	107
Seventh U.S. Army	18		20
First French Army	8		10
Corps (Seventh Army)	12		96
Divisions (Seventh Army)	72		96
Corps (First French Army)	2		2
Division (First French Army)	5		5

193. Reorganization of the SHAEF G-5 Division.

The establishment of military government in Germany posed several major problems which the planning staff of the G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters attempted to solve by reorganizing its staff structure. Subsidiary objectives of the move were threefold: coordination of the G-5 organization with that of the Allied Control Council for Germany, adaptation of the Division to the different type of operations required in occupied territory, and utilization of manpower assigned to the staff so as to attain maximum economy and efficiency. The plan, which became effective on 1 March 1945, provided for seven functional branches, representatives from five of which composed a planning committee.(4) The last major change in organization of the G-5 Division under the combined command , 30 April 1945, provided for eight branches: Supply, Displaced Persons, Legal, Public Health, Finance, Economics, Public Relations, and Administration.(5) This final reorganization constituted merely a regrouping of functions. Responsibilities of the G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters included formation of policies on civil affairs and military government; mobilization, training, and assignment of personnel to implement those policies; and supervision of execution of policies.

194. Role of the G-5 Division at Theater Headquarters Level.

The G-5 Division of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, functioned in the Communications Zone as an area command

subordinate to Supreme Headquarters. Because army groups were under the operational jurisdiction of the Supreme Command, the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters played but a minor role in the early development of military government in Germany. Only on personnel and administrative matters did the chain of command lead from the G-5 Divisions of army groups to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. The G-5 Division of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, eventually merged with the United States element of the G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters to form the G-5 staff of U.S. Forces, European Theater.(6)

195. G-5 Staffs in Army Groups.

a. The organization of G-5 Divisions in army groups anticipated to a large extent the form prescribed for them in Appendix "G" of SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 39.(7) After its reorganization on 17 March 1945,(8) the G-5 staff of the 12th Army Group conformed almost completely with the provisions of the directive. The only changes necessary subsequent to the publication of Appendix "G" were the reduction of the Public Safety Branch to the status of a subbranch under Internal Affairs and the reallocation of several functions of the Economics Branch. The most critical of the problems faced by the G-5 Division of the 12th Army Group was the lack of personnel for its military government detachments. On 6 May 1945 Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, authorized a temporary

overstrength in order to activate provisional military government units.(9) Personnel comprising the overstrength were attached to the European Civil Affairs Division for administrative purposes, and allocated to the First, Third, and Ninth U.S. Armies. When the 12th Army Group was inactivated on 1 August 1945,(10) officers of its G-5 Division were assigned to Theater Headquarters, which re-assigned several of them to the G-5 Division of the Theater General Board.(11)

b. When the 6th Army Group became operational on 15 September 1944, its Civil Affairs Section was granted general staff status in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Command. The 6th Army Group established a training center to provide specialists in the different phases of military government to supplement military government officers received from the European Civil Affairs Division.(12) When 6th Army Group was inactivated on 21 July 1945(13), its G-5 activities were absorbed by the G-5 Division of Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater.

196. G-5 Staffs in Armies.

a. The organizational pattern for civil affairs and military government sections in armies was established by a Table of Distribution and Allowances published on 15 April 1944.(14) The Table provided for an army G-5 division with a staff of thirty-one officers and fifty enlisted men of specific qualifications. As the European

Civil Affairs Division was not authorized to secure military government personnel from other than its own resources, army G-5 sections frequently were unable to obtain men of the grades and ratings indicated by the Table. Deviations from requirements imposed by the Table were made in the organization as well as the personnel of the G-5 staffs. The G-5 Division of the Third U.S. Army was established with only five of the twelve branches recommended by the Table of Distribution and Allowances. The First and Ninth Armies made similar adjustments. Through army groups, the Supreme Command attached specialists on monuments, fine arts, archives, and military histories to the army G-5 sections. Naval officers with specialized training in military government work were pressed into service. Further supplementing the G-5 staff were American Red Cross workers in civilian war relief and field directors of UNRRA. Operational control of all military government detachments was vested in the army commanders, although company headquarters handled matters of supply and administration for the units. To obtain additional military government personnel, the commanders of each of the four armies established training centers in their respective areas.

b. In accordance with instructions initiated by the Supreme Command, the First, Third and Ninth U.S. Armies mobilized about 130 provisional military government units for temporary deployment in the Soviet area.(15) When the Soviet forces assumed responsibility for military government on 4 July 1945, the American provisional detachments were withdrawn and disbanded.

c. With the formal confirmation of the Eastern Military District on 12 August 1945(16), the G-5 Division of the Third Army was reorganized as the Office of Military Government for Bavaria, and consolidated with Regional Military Government Detachment E-201. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, of the Third Army became Deputy Director of the new organization. The G-5 Division of Seventh U.S. Army was reorganized at the same time. A staff memorandum of the Seventh U.S. Army placed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, on a Deputy Chief of Staff level and made him responsible to the army commander for all military government of Western Military District.(17) When the Seventh U.S. Army was phased out on 1 April 1946(18), its area, units, and functions were put under Third Army control. On 1 January 1946 the G-5 Division of the Third Army was reestablished with Administration, Military Government, and Displaced Persons Branches. The most important functions of the new G-5 Division were the control of displaced persons and acting as liaison between the independent units of military government and tactical forces, whose only other tie was the Theater Commander.

197. The G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters.

a. After final determination of the exact limits of the United States Zone on 17 July 1945, the functions assigned to the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters rapidly increased. When the German Economic Control Agency was abolished on 1 August 1945(20), its functions

and personnel were assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, of Theater Headquarters. On 10 August 1945, the Theater G-5 Division assumed control of all German plants which processed or stored food and beverages.(21) With the elimination of the Production Control Agency on 24 August 1945, the Industry Branch was established to take over its responsibilities under the direction of the G-5 Division. The Industry Branch planned for the industrial disarmament of Germany and supervised all activities of military government agencies in the control of industry. These responsibilities were of brief duration, however, for on 1 October 1945 the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters was redesignated as the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) and its personnel and functions were absorbed by the new organization.(22) This move resulted in a complete break between military government and the tactical forces, the only remaining liaison being the Theater Commander, who was also Military Governor of the United States Zone.

b. Consolidation of the varied divisions and branches of military government at Berlin early in 1946 led to the reestablishment of the G-5 Division at Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater. Accordingly a general order recreating the G-5 staff of the Theater Commander was published on 7 March 1946 to become effective on 1 April.(23) At the same time, the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) was disbanded and its functions were divided between the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and the new G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters. Fifty-eight officers and two

warrant officers were assigned to the G-5 staff on 28 March 1946.(24) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, held also the post of Chief of the Displaced Persons Branch. The organizational chart of the Division provided for seven branches: Plans and Coordination, Reports and Information, Administration, Economic Affairs, Government Affairs, Supply , and Displaced Persons. The G-5 Division was charged with the following staff responsibilities: advising the Theater Commander on military government matters affecting the occupation forces; coordinating the activities of field forces with those of military government agencies; maintaining liaison with the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.); caring for displaced persons in the United States Zone and repatriating them in accordance with arrangements made by the Combined Repatriation Executive of the Allied Control Authority; establishing liaison with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in the United States Zone and also for Germany as a whole; and conducting civil affairs in countries other than Germany.

198. G-5 Division of the General Board.

The General Board of Theater Headquarters was established on 17 June 1945 as a special unit within the Headquarters of the Fifteenth U.S. Army, which became a station complement for the Board.(25) The purpose of the General Board was to analyze the campaign in the European Theater and the tactics and administration of the U.S. forces

in the European Theater, and to make studies and recommendations on such special problems as were referred to it by Theater Headquarters.(26) Brig. Gen. C. E. Ryan headed the G-5 Section of the General Board, which was staffed by a group of historians, analysts, and research specialists, assisted periodically by special consultants.

DISPLACED PERSONS

199. Origin of the Displaced Persons.

a. In 1939 Germany lacked adequate manpower for prolonged total war, and it was only through the use of foreign labor that the Nazis were able to maintain simultaneously a large military force and a high level of industrial and agricultural production. It was estimated that before the war the Reich was employing half a million foreign workers, largely Italians. Large-scale recruitment of additional workers dated from the autumn of 1939, after the outbreak of the war. These consisted mostly of forced laborers and prisoners from the conquered countries. By the close of 1940, a million foreign laborers were in Germany, and the number had increased to an estimated five million by June 1943.

b. In obtaining laborers throughout the occupied countries the Nazis employed recruitment methods which varied from enticement to indirect compulsion and open conscription. They described all foreign

laborers as volunteers, but they divided them into three categories; and had a distinct standard of treatment for each group. The first group, coming from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, received virtually the same pay and treatment as German laborers. The second group, the Poles, received only the lowest customary rate of pay and were subject to many restrictions in public places. The third group, composed of Russians and Ukrainians, received the worst treatment of all, as they were denied the few benefits extended to most foreign workers.

c. In June 1944 it was estimated that there were 11,332,700 displaced persons and refugees (exclusive of German refugees) in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, and Germany. Of this number, 8,935,400 were displaced persons in foreign countries and 2,397,300 were refugees within their own countries. They spoke at least twenty different languages, came from twenty countries, and were the concern of as many governments.

200. Plans for Dealing with Displaced Persons.

a. Plans for handling displaced persons were being studied by the United States cabinet as early as 29 October 1942. The broad policies and procedures with respect to these individuals were comprehensively stated in the "Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons," published by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force on 4 June 1944. This provided, among other things, that

machinery in liberated territories would be set up so as to prevent, insofar as possible, movement of displaced persons and refugees from hindering operations of the armies. The care, control, and repatriation of these persons was made the responsibility of the Allied national authorities concerned, subject to supervision by the military. The principles of this plan remained in effect during most of the operations in France and Belgium. The policies announced in June 1944 were, in general, reiterated in an administrative memorandum of Supreme Headquarters, dated 18 November 1944 and revised 16 April 1945. The revised policies, designed to serve as a guide for operations in Germany, differed in many respects from those of the "Outline Plan." During the period of combat operations, Supreme Headquarters assumed over-all administrative supervision of the care, control, and repatriation of displaced persons and control of refugees, but after military government was imposed, responsibility for United Nations displaced persons was vested in field commanders..

b. The Yalta Agreement, concluded on 11 February 1945 at Yalta, in Crimea, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and Great Britain, included plans for the care of displaced persons of the three countries concerned. As it gave to liberated Soviet citizens the same maintenance scale as that authorized for Allied military personnel, the Yalta Agreement created a privileged class of persons whose handling became more and more difficult.

201. Early Experiences in Handling Displaced Persons.

a. The displaced population encountered during the period just after V-E Day consisted mainly of refugees rather than displaced persons. During December 1944 the first displaced persons were moved from army areas into the French Zone of the Interior. Agencies, other than the military and Allied national authorities concerned, which assisted in the care and control of displaced persons and refugees were UNRRA, Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, and Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative. The Displaced Persons Executive was that part of the civil affairs organization assigned to specific tasks in connection with the discharge of the Supreme Commander's responsibility for refugees and displaced persons.

b. The displaced persons program in France was at all times handicapped by inadequate housing, food, fuel, medical supplies, and clothing, and transportation was not always available for bringing supplies into camps. The knowledge gained in movements of displaced persons in France and other liberated countries proved to be invaluable in organizing the mass movements which characterized the program of repatriation from Germany.

202. Experience in Handling Displaced Persons Gained in the Rhineland Campaign.

a. Under the "standfast" policy directed by Supreme Headquarters prior to the invasion of Germany, no uncontrolled movement

of displaced persons was to be permitted. Western Europeans were to be returned to their countries as soon as possible, and eastern Europeans were to be collected and held in assembly centers pending completion of arrangements for their crossing Soviet lines for repatriation.

b. As the United States armies advanced into Germany east of the Rhine, the numbers of liberated displaced persons increased considerably. Housing, transportation, and communication facilities were inadequate. It became apparent that existing plans for displaced persons centers were not feasible in view of conditions encountered and personnel available. Experience gained in France and in Germany indicated that plans for executing largescale movements should take into consideration the need for careful synchronization of transport and movements, study of traffic flow and available routes, and planning of reception arrangements.

203. The Displaced Population as of V-E Day.

On 8 May 1945 there were over 2,320,000 displaced persons in the part of Germany under American control (areas held by the 12th and 6th Army Groups). Maintenance of law and order was a problem of grave concern to military authorities, as many displaced persons went on a rampage on being liberated. This usually took the form of wild and unauthorized shooting, and widespread looting of German homes, stores, and warehouses. When tactical units could be used, order was rapidly established.

204. Readjustment and Changes in Administration after V-E Day.

Staff responsibility for displaced persons operations during the period of combined command was assigned to G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters. The staff element with primary responsibility was known as the Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Welfare Branch, redesignated in March 1945 as the Displaced Persons Branch. Upon the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters on 14 July 1945, U.S. Forces, European Theater, assumed control of the United States Zone of Germany. A new agency, known as the Combined Displaced Persons Executive, continued operations with respect to displaced persons. The Combined Displaced Persons Executive ceased to exist on 1 October 1945, on which date the Combined Repatriation Executive came into being. The new agency was a quadripartite body under the Allied Control Authority, with the function of coordinating interzonal and repatriation movements. After this change, displaced persons operations became zonal functions, staff responsibility in the United States Zone being exercised by the Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 Division, U.S. Forces, European Theater. The Combined Repatriation Executive was the operating agency of the Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Directorate of the Allied Control Authority.

205. Reduction of the Displaced Population.

a. During the period of combat operations, repatriation of displaced persons was undertaken only when operations permitted or

required. Upon termination of hostilities, however, repatriation became an undertaking of high priority and major importance. Displaced persons returned home in many types of transport. Organized movements were made by truck convoy, train, air, and boats, but there were also many repatriates who traveled on foot, by bicycle, in automobile and horse-drawn conveyances.

b. In May alone, more than half of the French, Belgians, Netherlanders, and Luxemburgers were repatriated, and by 15 June 1945 the greater part of the displaced western Europeans had been returned to their native countries. Soviet citizens constituted the largest single category remaining to be repatriated from the United States Zone. Although the movement of Soviet citizens homeward did not get under way until May, almost 99 percent of those uncovered in the United States Zone had been repatriated by the end of August. This record was possible because of agreements concluded between Soviet and United States authorities. Mass delivery through army lines officially began with the signing of the Halle Agreement on 22 May 1945. Informal movement of Italians began early in June, and, as a result of conferences held at Bolzano and Rome, the repatriation of Italians progressed rapidly from June through September. By the end of September 1945 more than 97 percent of all known displaced Italians in the United States Zone had been sent home. Polish repatriation actually started about mid-July 1945, but progressed very slowly. Other agreements facilitated the repatriation of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Balkan ex-enemy nationals.

206. Disposition of Special Categories of Displaced Persons.

a. Soviet citizens uncovered in Allied military operations originally were treated in the same manner as other United Nations nationals. However, the Yalta Agreement contained special additional provisions for their benefit, one being that they were in all cases to be segregated in special centers as soon as their claims to Soviet citizenship had been accepted by the Soviet repatriation representative.

b. In June 1945 the Supreme Commander directed that immediate plans should be made to establish special camps for stateless and nonrepatriable persons and those whose repatriation was likely to be deferred for some time. In August 1945 this policy was restated more completely. The established policy of U.S. Forces, European Theater, was that stateless and nonrepatriable persons should be granted the same assistance as United Nations displaced persons.

c. Special considerations were asked for persecutees, including Jewish displaced persons. In October 1945 special rations were authorized for certain persons who had been persecuted by the Nazis. Persecutees who so desired were to be accommodated in special centers apart from other displaced-persons installations, and those living in approved centers were to receive a food ration of 2,500 calories per person a day, instead of the regular ration of 2,300 calories. Persecutees residing outside approved centers were entitled to a ration card one category higher than the German rations which would otherwise have been authorized for them.

d. The policy affecting ex-enemy displaced persons provided that they would be returned to their countries of nationality or former residence, without regard to their personal wishes, with the exception of persecutees among them who were assimilated to United Nations status.

207. Care and Maintenance of Displaced Persons.

The care and maintenance of United Nations displaced persons was from the first the responsibility of the senior military commander. Upon termination of hostilities, field commanders were directed to execute fully the plan for care and control of displaced persons. In the summer of 1945 the Theater Commander reviewed the problem of displaced persons and established the standard for their care and maintenance. It was emphasized that the care of United Nations displaced persons and assimilees still remained a major military objective. Provisions were made for obtaining necessary supplies and for furnishing displaced persons with medical care, educational opportunities, and employment. Special attention was given to the care and protection of displaced children uncovered in Germany, with particular reference to those who were not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian.

208. Relationship between the Army and UNRRA.

- a. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration program in the United States Zone of Germany was limited to the performance of certain functions delegated to the agency by the

Theater Commander. The military assumed responsibility for basic supplies for the care of displaced persons, which included food, clothing, and shelter, and supplies necessary to maintain health and sanitation within the camps. It also was responsible for transporting supplies to the camps, maintaining security, and providing communication facilities. The Army also agreed to furnish necessary facilities for the maintenance of administrative operations of UNRRA at team level and at necessary headquarters within the United States Zone. UNRRA provided the necessary personnel for camp administration and supervision above the team level, and also agreed to furnish such supplies as cigarettes, soap, and razor blades for the displaced persons. During the first few months of the occupation, there existed some confusion with respect to the relationship which should exist between the Army and UNRRA, but this relationship was on a much more satisfactory basis during the latter part of 1945.

b. The agreement made between the Supreme Commander and UNRRA on 25 November 1944 continued in effect even after the dissolution of the combined command in July 1945. The draft of a proposed new agreement between the military authorities in the United States Zone and UNRRA was submitted to the War Department for approval in September 1945, and an approved draft was released by the War Department in January 1946. This was amended and signed as the new agreement on 19 February 1946.

209. Changes in Administrative Structure in 1946.

a. On 1 January 1946, the Offices of Military Government for the three German Lander in the United States Zone became independent commands under their respective directors. However, the Commanding Generals, Eastern and Western Military Districts, and the Commanding General, Theater Service Forces, retained existing responsibilities for the administration of displaced persons, including the management of camps, disciplinary control, supply, and movement of such persons. With this change in administrative structure, responsibility for displaced persons was transferred from military government units to units of the occupational forces. The 1st Armored Division assumed control of all camps and assembly centers in the Wurttemberg-Baden area, and the 3d Infantry Division assumed control in Grosshessen.

b. On 1 April 1946 the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) ceased to exist, and simultaneously there was established in Theater Headquarters a new G-5 Division with primary staff responsibility for displaced persons. The G-5 Division was charged with the supervision of control, maintenance, and care of displaced persons in the United States Zone and their repatriation in accordance with announced policies and in accordance with arrangements made by the Combined Repatriation Executive of the Allied Control Authority for coordinating group movements between the United States Zone and other zones or other countries.

210. Outstanding Problems in the First Six Months of 1946.

a. During October 1945 it became apparent that Jews were infiltrating into the United States Zone of Germany in substantial numbers. This migration continued for weeks, attaining peaks in December 1945, in February 1946, and in the following spring. The exodus was generally from eastern Europe, predominantly from Poland, where, it was estimated, as many as 90 percent of the infiltrates originated. Early in January there were approximately 40,000 Jews in the United States Zone. The policy in regard to these persons, initially, was to admit them to special centers apart from other displaced persons and accord them reasonable care until their status had been clarified. Infiltration of displaced persons into the United States Zone showed a marked increase during the month of May 1946 and continued at a steadily accelerating rate from all directions in June.

b. An increasing amount of lawlessness and crime throughout the fall of 1945 indicated the inadequacy of existing policies for maintaining law and order among displaced persons. New directives on maintenance of law and order were issued in January and again in March 1946. In May the Theater Commander expressed dissatisfaction with existing control over displaced persons, as evidenced by the many reports of their participation in armed aggression, theft, and black-market activities, and ordered a resurvey of all control measures then in effect.

211. Review of Status of United Nations Displaced Persons in 1946.

a. In order to clarify the doubtful status of many displaced persons and to encourage repatriation, a review of the status of all persons who had been accorded United Nations displaced persons treatment was proposed in November 1945. The plan, as determined in January 1946 with the approval of the War Department, was simplified to consist of a thorough screening of all inhabitants of United Nations assembly centers and of future applicants for admission thereto. Plans were laid for a full-scale screening to begin in June 1946. By the end of June, approximately 12 percent of the displaced persons in the United States Zone had been screened. Approximately 8 percent of these had been found unqualified for displaced persons status.

b. Theater policy on the repatriation of Soviet citizens as restated early in January 1946 provided that certain categories would be repatriated without regard to their personal wishes and by force if necessary.

c. The proposal to discontinue United Nations displaced persons care and treatment for certain categories of displaced persons, considered in November of the previous year, became effective on 15 May 1946. The provision was applicable to nationals of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Norway, but certain exceptions were made.

d. The President of the United States issued, under date of 22 December 1945, a directive on immigration, which had the effect

of setting in motion preparations for the early resumption of immigration to the United States. It was realized, however, that the established quotas for immigration would not permit entry to any appreciable number of displaced persons.

e. On 30 June 1946 there were in the United States Zone of Germany 368,000 United Nations displaced persons in camps and 115,000 (estimated) outside camps, for a total of 483,000; in the United States Zone of Austria there were 23,039 in camps and 20,489 out of camps, for a total of 43,528.

f. In June 1946 the responsibility for displaced persons was delegated to the Third U.S. Army, which in turn delegated the responsibility to field units. Actual camp operation was performed by UNRRA, which had approximately 143 assembly center teams supervising about 454 separate displaced persons camps.

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Chapter XIII

1. Interview with Mr. Abe Vinik, asst youth activities officer, Education and Religious Affairs Br, OMG for Grosshessen.
2. SHAEF, Handbook for Military Government in Germany, pt III, chap X, sec 1, par 381.
3. Annual History, Education and Religious Affairs Div, OMG for Grosshessen, p 51.
4. Ltr, Seventh Army, 14 Sep 45, file AG 353.8/2, subj: "Organization of Youth Activities."
5. Ltr, USFET, 25 Oct 45, file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO, subj: "Amendment to Part I (Education), Section VII (Education and Religious Affairs), Administration of Military Government in the U.S. Zone in Germany, 7 July 1945."
6. Ibid.
7. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference.
8. Ltr, USFET, 15 Apr 46, file AG 353.8 GCT-AGO, subj: "Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, US Zone."
9. Education and Religious Affairs, Monthly Report of Mil Gov, Jul 46.
10. OMGSUS, ODI, Sentinel, No 2, 15 Jun 46, p 5.

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Chapter XIV

1. Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater, OTCOT, vol VIII, pt 2, ch 4.
2. History of Advance Section, Com Z, 43-45, plate 10.
3. Consolidated Operational Report on TC Activities in the European Theater of Operations, ETOUSA, May 42 through V-E Day, file 321/1.
4. Ltr, 2d MRS, 26 Jul 45, filed in 2d MRS files with OMGUS (Rear), subj: "Movement Traffic - Destination Berlin," to Lt Col O. H. Osborn, sgd Maj E. W. Hargrave.
5. SOP 67 A, USFET, 27 Aug 45, subj: "Development of Monthly Personnel and Movement Program in United States Occupation Areas."
6. Ltr, SHAEF, 11 Jun 45, file AG 322 ECITO, subj: "European Central Inland Transport Organization."
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9. Ltr, ETOUSA, 12 Jul 45, file Sig 311, subj: "Signal Communications Responsibilities: Post 'ECLIPSE', US Occupation Forces Germany."
10. TSFET, OTSgo, Report of Operations, 15 Jul-30 Sep 45, p 4.
11. SOP 37, USFET, 1 May 44, revised 1 Jan 45.
12. Memo, USFET, 29 Oct 45, subj: "Report of Requisitioned Property."

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13. Ltr, USFET, 19 Sep 45, subj: "Special Occupational Planning Board."
14. SOP 57, USFET, 1 Apr 45, C 2, 22 Aug 45; AG Act Rec file 400.703.
15. History of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, 12 May-31 Oct 45.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Executive Order of the President, 9630, 27 Sep 45; Bureau of Budget Act; Order 12, Office of the Central Field Commissioner for Europe, 6 Nov 45.
20. Field Comm Guide 1 (copy in Hist Div Docs, file V-1333-1)
21. TM 38-420, Disposition of Excess and Surplus Property in Overseas Commands, 4 Sep 45, sec III.
22. SOP 5, ETOUSA, pt II, par 4.
23. SOP 57, ETOUSA, par h.
24. AG Act Rec, file P 400.7, 1945.
25. Ibid, file 400.703, 1945.
26. Cf n. 23.
27. IRS, USFET, ACofS, 4 Jun 46 (copy in G-4 Surplus Material file, vol 1).
28. Ibid.
29. USFET Command and Staff Conference Notes, 30 Nov 45, p 34.

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31. Ibid, 2 Nov 45, p 12.
32. Ibid, 19 Oct 45, p 13.
33. Ibid, 4 Jan 46, p 5.
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35. History of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Env 5.
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subj: "Control of Enemy War Material in Germany and
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